The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP

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! deforestation rates based on some kind of model, although how well this will represent the counterfactual will not be observable, so concerns about arbitrariness of the payments and their impacts will remain. Another political and moral concern relates to the fairness of the distribution of REDD payments. Countries that have made efforts to reduce their deforestation rates in the past may see little benefit from a REDD payment scheme, while countries that have caused high deforestation rates through poor or uncaring policies may receive high payments. 13 Many may regard such a scheme as unfair, even if the adverse incentives problem can be avoided. This concern is why several of the proposals made to date for REDD payment schemes incorporate some kind of distributional mechanism. Such distributional payments, while helping to assure the political feasibility of a scheme, do nothing to reduce emissions and hence reduce the cost effectiveness of the scheme. The possibility of leakages is another serious challenge, especially if payments are made for projects in sub-national regions or in small countries. Payments to reduce deforestation and degradation in one location may result in shifting the location of deforestation and degradation to another location, whether it is elsewhere in the same country or in other countries. To help address this problem, it may work better to make payments for REDD in larger geographical units, whether nations or even supra-national units, especially among small neighboring forested countries (for example, in Central America). However, making REDD payments to larger geographical and political units may undermine the goal of using such payments to help improve the livelihoods of poor people (more on this below). Furthermore, leakages can still occur even between countries or continents that are distant from each other. To the extent that such payments are effective in increasing the prices of forest products or other products that are promoted by deforestation (for example, cattle in Latin America), market level effects may cause leakages even to areas far away from where REDD payments are applied. For example, if REDD payments cause the price of Brazilian cattle to increase as a result of reduced forest land available for ranching, cattle ranching for export markets may shift to other countries or continents, possibly contributing to increased deforestation in those locations. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 13 Of course, this criticism also can be applied to payments for emissions reductions through other types of projects, such as energy projects; i.e., countries that have polluted more in the past qualify for larger payments.! ! (,!
! REDD payments also could have negative impacts on poor people in developing countries. The prospects of receiving large payments may encourage governments or powerful private interests to forcibly evict land users from forests and forest margin areas, with severe negative impacts on their well being. Such problems are particularly likely to arise where communities and households do not have secure tenure to their land, and where corruption is a serious problem, both of which are common in forest areas of many developing countries. Such negative impacts could be offset or even outweighed by investments in improving the livelihoods of poor rural people, especially those who depend on forests. Whether such investments will actually take place and be effective in helping poor people depends greatly on the real (as opposed to the stated) objectives of policy makers or other elite groups (that is, whether benefiting the rural poor is a real objective supported by political will), on the extent of corruption, on the capacity of governments to identify and implement policies and investments that will benefit the affected rural poor, and on the costs of carrying out such policies and investments. Unfortunately, the developing countries that have the most to gain from a REDD payment scheme also tend to have greater problems of corruption and weak capacity (Figure 4- 3). A final concern with REDD payments is that they may substantially increase the supply of available offsets, flooding the market and crowding out other emissions reductions (Ecosecurities and Global Mechanism 2008). This is not necessarily a problem if the emissions reductions from REDD are real and additive, if the objective is to obtain the most emissions reductions at the lowest cost (which is the main economic rationale for allowing emissions trading). But, as noted above, assuring the additionality of emissions reductions purchased through REDD payments will be difficult. This may undermine the effectiveness of emissions reduction efforts globally (if the reductions are not additive) and hence may erode support for the entire cap and trade system if the targeted global reductions in GHG emissions are not achieved as a result. Solutions to this problem could be to keep the REDD market separate from other carbon markets (that is, not allow REDD payments to offset other emissions reductions), support REDD payments through a separate fund rather than carbon markets, or discount the value of REDD emissions reductions relative to other emissions reductions considered to be more certain and verifiable (for example, one ton of CO 2 e reduction through REDD could be set to equal 0.5 ton ! )-!
Page 1 and 2:
Land&Climate The Role of Sustainabl
Page 3 and 4:
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Climate
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Table of Contents Executive Summary
Page 7 and 8:
List of Figures Figure 2-1. Number
Page 9 and 10:
ICRISAT IGAD IPCC ISDR JI lCER LDCF
Page 11 and 12:
! EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Coping with cli
Page 13 and 14:
! organic carbon. SLM represents a
Page 15 and 16:
! tenure insecurity in many African
Page 17 and 18:
! To achieve success in the first t
Page 19 and 20:
! degradation, soil and biomass car
Page 21 and 22:
! 2. The Challenge of Climate Varia
Page 23 and 24:
! production and food security for
Page 25 and 26: ! production in Africa and other re
Page 27 and 28: ! Ethiopia consider soil and water
Page 29 and 30: ! the region is degraded to such an
Page 31 and 32: ! In terms of affected area, UNEP (
Page 33 and 34: ! techniques, like bunding (e.g. Ke
Page 35 and 36: ! flooding in sloping lands and pro
Page 37 and 38: ! Reducing Emissions from Deforesta
Page 39 and 40: ! organic carbon. Principles of div
Page 41 and 42: ! A first major impact in Africa wo
Page 43 and 44: ! the practices and qualitatively a
Page 45 and 46: ! o Several adaptation funds have b
Page 47 and 48: ! feeding practices), improved fert
Page 49 and 50: ! billion for the CTF and $2.0 bill
Page 51 and 52: ! require social and environment be
Page 53 and 54: ! focus on financing CDM and/or JI
Page 55 and 56: ! nations have ratified (or adopted
Page 57 and 58: ! vulnerability assessment, develop
Page 59 and 60: ! The TerrAfrica partnership is pla
Page 61 and 62: ! o increased use of voluntary carb
Page 63 and 64: ! • increased integration of clim
Page 65 and 66: ! allowances and offsets are within
Page 67 and 68: ! greater financial resources than
Page 69 and 70: ! activities (these challenges are
Page 71 and 72: ! CER can be carried over to subseq
Page 73 and 74: ! However, the limited extent of su
Page 75: ! doubts about the verifiability an
Page 79 and 80: ! VCS, rather than trying to measur
Page 81 and 82: ! Applied research and knowledge ma
Page 83 and 84: ! important to address, so that the
Page 85 and 86: ! As shown earlier in this report,
Page 87 and 88: ! non-A/R projects (a lower thresho
Page 89 and 90: ! countries, including national pov
Page 91 and 92: ! and developing programs and proje
Page 93 and 94: ! • Land degradation increases th
Page 95 and 96: ! • Constraints to increased use
Page 97 and 98: ! and TerrAfrica process to develop
Page 99 and 100: ! Table 2-2. Projected mean tempera
Page 101 and 102: ! Table 2-5. Severe environmental c
Page 103 and 104: ! Table 3-2. Importance of Causes o
Page 105 and 106: ! Practice Adaptation aspects Mitig
Page 107 and 108: ! Table 4-1. Carbon markets, volume
Page 109 and 110: ! Table 4-3. Summary of Progress du
Page 111 and 112: ! Figure 2-3. Projected increases i
Page 113 and 114: ! Figure 3-1. NDVI based estimates
Page 115 and 116: ! Figure 3-3. Greenhouse gas emissi
Page 117 and 118: ! Figure 4-2. Potential savings by
Page 119 and 120: ! References ! Ambrosi, P. 2009. No
Page 121 and 122: ! Dregne, H. and M. Kassas. 1991. A
Page 123 and 124: ! Kruseman, G., Ruben, R. and G. Te
Page 125 and 126: ! Sustainable Land Management in th
Page 127:
! United States Government Accounta
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