JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters - Defense Innovation ...

Joint Task Force Command and Control
(b) Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to
exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit
self-defense includes the defense of other DOD forces in the vicinity.
(c) JTF SJAs should coordinate with NG counterparts when operating in a
domestic support environment to confirm the RUF approved for use by the NG. There may
be a difference between the ROE or RUF approved for DOD forces and the RUF for each
states NG forces operating in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. Depending on the
state, because NG RUF are based on the criminal law of the state in which an NG unit is
performing the mission, the RUF may be more or less restrictive than the approved DOD
RUF.
For more details concerning ROE and RUF, refer to the CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of
Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SECRET).
f. Interorganizational (Less Multinational) Considerations
(1) Relationships between the JTF and USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and
NGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. During combat operations
such as Operation DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations
such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by
other USG departments and agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide DSCA, its forces
perform in a supporting role. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between
the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination.
Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the JTF to build support,
conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals
through unity of effort.
(2) NGOs do not operate within a military, governmental, United Nations (UN), or
other IGO hierarchies. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place
themselves in a supporting role to the military. However, an associate or partnership
relationship may develop during some missions. For example, if the UN has provided a
grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would be considered its “implementing
partner.” If formed, the CMOC is the focal point where US military forces coordinate any
support to NGOs.
(a) As mentioned above, a coordinated effort between the JTF and USG
departments and agencies, NGOs, and IGOs is essential to achieve our national objectives
but should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Military operations depend upon
a command structure that often is very different from that of civilian organizations. These
differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG
departments’ and agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures,
and decision-making techniques make achieving unity of effort a challenge. Still more
difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of
the USG, and particularly the US military.
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