Entire Volume 17 issue 1 - Journal of World-Systems Research ...

175 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH
Portuguese control. 6
Just as the Levant trade was forced into decline, Abyssinia experienced
similar deleterious effects; it is not coincidental that the period from 1500 to 1769 is associated
with the decline of the Solomonic Dynasty (Marcus 1994:30-47).
The theoretical reason for non-inclusion comes down to dominance. This reflects the
overly Eurocentric nature of the Wallersteinian world-system. Reminiscent of the “favorable
order” required for incorporation, the Indian Ocean is external because:
To appreciate why we do not consider the Indian Ocean trading area to be part of
the European world-economy despite the fact that it was so completely
dominated by a European power, we must look successively at the meaning of
this dominance for the Asian countries affected, its meaning for Europe, and how
it compares with those parts of the Americas under Iberian rule (Wallerstein
1974:328).
Because the Portuguese took over a pre-existing trade network, they did not establish political
dominance. Therefore trade was carried on in a framework established by the Asian nations, and
the “social organization of the economy as well as the political superstructures remained largely
untouched” (Wallerstein 1974:331). Essentially, if nations or external actors can possibly set the
terms of trade, Wallerstein defines them as outside the system. Successful resistance implies
externality.
This illustrates some conceptual problems that emerge in the discussion of inter-systemic
trade. What happens when two previously independent systems come into contact with one
another? If the polity being contacted can negotiate its own terms, should it be external to the
system as no reorganization of the economy is enacted? If so, this mandates that, by definition,
the “world-system” being discussed is one of European dominance. Thus, there is no notion of
“equal exchange” or mutual benefit; the process of incorporation becomes synonymous with the
process of European subjugation. This is evident in the discussion of the difference between the
Iberian experience in Asia to that in the Americas: “Iberia establishes colonies in the Americas,
but trading-posts in Asia” (Wallerstein 1974:335, emphasis in original), meaning “that the
Americas became the periphery of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century while
Asia remained an external arena” (1974:336, emphasis in original). This seems counterintuitive
– as there was a developed economy in place in Asia, should that not more easily become linked
to the expanding European world-economy since an economy does not have to be created from
scratch? The benefits have to accrue to Europe, not Asia, thus shifting to a political definition of
the system.
By minimizing external agency (i.e., political power in the external arena), Wallerstein
unnecessarily hamstrings the notion of the expanding world-system with a shift from defining
characteristics based on economic factors (i.e., bulk goods) and their production to political
control and social dominance. This runs directly counter to the conception of the world-system as
a process “based on the fact that the economic factors operate within an arena larger than that
which any political entity can totally control” (Wallerstein 1974:348). By ignoring the non-
6 Enticingly, a subsidiary stop for Portuguese goods was located at Aden. But these goods were bound for
the intermediate markets of Malacca, Calicut, and Ormuz, not ports on the Red Sea coast (Wallerstein
1974:327).