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HYDROPOLITICAL COMPLEXES AND POWER 232 that the external actors tend to augment economic and soft power, as opposed to promoting hard power. There are known strategies for asserting economic power, such as altering the amount of trade and aid, and for leveraging soft power, such as technology transfers, that can be used to increase cooperation. This serves the objectives of hydropolitical complexes, albeit indirectly, to increase regional cooperation and achieve negotiated settlements for water-sharing policies in shared river systems. The weakest riparians do not have the economic resources, political capacity, or nonviolent leverage to balance asymmetrical power in hydropolitical complexes, so they often appeal to external actors to augment their power. The cross sectional analysis provides empirical evidence to support the importance of external international influence on asymmetrical power relations and cooperation within hydropolitical complexes. The role of external actors will become increasingly important in the internal power dynamics of hydropolitical complexes as competition between riparians intensifies. The decision to promote cooperation or provoke conflict will become more consequential as water use and water scarcity increase. International actors that choose to get involved in international water disputes and regional hydropolitical complexes will need to keep pace with these changes. Future research needs to disaggregate the findings of this study, and others, as well as analyze the motives behind international involvement in hydropolitical complexes. We cannot ignore the temptation of external actors to manipulate water disputes in order to increase or maintain their own access to vital resources. New research also needs to be conducted on the effects of multinational corporations, as external international actors, asserting leverage in hydropolitical complexes. A systematic comparative analysis of variation in the strategies and outcomes of foreign influence by multinational corporations, foreign governments, and international financial institutions would be informative. As water becomes increasingly privatized and corporations consolidate their control over vital resources, it is useful to anticipate the impact on international river systems so that the international community can offer alternative forms of economic and soft power to promote cooperation and prevent conflict. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author appreciates the generous financial support from the Research Council and Office of Research and Sponsored Programs at Rutgers University, as well as the constructive comments from a team of colleagues and anonymous reviewers. REFERENCES Boyce, James. 2002. Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 351. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Braudel, Fernand. 1979. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV e -XVIII e siècle, le temps du monde vol. 3. Paris: LGF Publishers (1979) and Berkeley: University of California Press (English translation 1992). Browder, Greg. 2000. “An Analysis of the Negotiations for the 1995 Mekong Agreement.” International Negotiation 5: 237-261.
233 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Peter Grimes. 1995. “World-Systems Analysis.” Annual Review of Sociology 21: 387-417. Dinar, Ariel and Senai Alemu. 2000. “The Process of Negotiation Over International Water Disputes: The Case of the Nile Basin.” International Negotiation 5: 331-356. Dinar, Shlomi. 2000. “Negotiations and International Relations: A Framework for Hydropolitics.” International Negotiation 5: 375-407. Elhance, Arun P. 2000. “Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope.” International Negotiation 5: 201-222. Elhance, Arun P. 1999. Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Klare, Michael. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Le Billon, Philippe. 2005. Fueling War: Natural resources and armed conflict. New York: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Lukes, Steven. 1997. Power: A Radical View. Palgrave Macmillan. Mead, Walter Russell. 2004. “America’s Sticky Power.” Foreign Policy 141: 46-53. NATO. 1999. See levels of conflict: durable peace, stable peace, unstable peace, crisis, war, with variations developed by NATO 1998, ratified and institutionalized in 1999. Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Perseus. Posthumus, Bram. 2000. “Nile Basin Nations Move Towards Cooperation.” European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. Conflict Prevention Newsletter Special on Water and Conflict, One World 3: 4-7, 13-20. Spector, Bertram. 2000. “Motivating Water Diplomacy: Finding the Situational Incentives to Negotiate.” International Negotiation 5: 223-236. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York and London: Academic Press. Zeitoun, Mark and Jeroen Warner. 2006. “Hydro-hegemony.” Water Policy 8: 435-460.
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James Rice—New Mexico State Unive
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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY 236 Review Essay:
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