Entire Volume 17 issue 1 - Journal of World-Systems Research ...

BOOK REVIEWS 278
even among its contemporaries, and as he goes on to detail exhaustively, it was certainly not the
most inventive nor productive state of antiquity (pg. 63).
Indeed, in some respects, the differences between the U.S. and Ancient Rome are vast.
Smil describes how the Romans were not very impressive inventors or innovators, whereas the
U.S. has been a leader of invention and innovation. The Roman Empire did little to advance
scientific understanding, and their technical accomplishments occurred slowly over time. Ancient
Romans were far more dependent on machines that were powered by people (slaves primarily)
and animals. This is “fundamentally incomparable” to the U.S., which is powered
overwhelmingly by machines and non-animal based energy (pg. 103). Whereas the Romans’
energy use seriously constrained every aspect of Roman society, America’s high energy
availability has created massive opportunities and problems that are not comparable to the Rome
of antiquity. Moreover, the U.S. is remarkable compared to contemporary states, whereas Rome’s
record in invention was not very impressive compared to Hellenistic Greece or Han China.
Differences in quality of life between Ancient Rome and modern America are incommensurable,
whether measured as GDP, GDP rate of increase, infant mortality, life expectancy, housing
conditions, wealth inequality, reliance on machines, or energy use.
Smil concludes that “whatever lessons can be drawn from the demise of the Western
Roman Empire are of little avail in illuminating the global reverberations of any dramatic
weakening of America’s standing in the modern world” (pg. 148). In terms of the fall of Rome
and the predicted fall of the U.S., Smil maintains that there is little to support comparisons. One
could even contest the idea that there was a fall of Rome, since in reality it was more of a slow
decline (and applicable mainly to the Western Empire). Ironically, in this the two are reportedly
similar: the U.S. has been experiencing “a gradual retreat encompassing all parameters that make
a nation a great power” since World War II (pg. 168). It is not likely that its power will abruptly
vanish. Smil argues that surmises of the dramatic fall of the U.S. in the near future are rhetorical
hyperbole.
While Smil’s book is thoroughly researched and appears adequately objective, I am not
convinced that the designation of America as a New Rome is quite so rife within academic
discourse to justify devoting an entire book to refuting it. Immanuel Wallerstein has already
established that there is a difference between a world-empire and a world-economy, but Smil
does not engage the world-systems perspective at all, either to critique or incorporate. Much of
his examination of the differences between Rome and the U.S., which takes up about 50% of the
book, seems to be overreaching the mark; it should be self-evident that daily conditions were very
different between modernity and antiquity, especially with regards to common indicators. It
would have been more interesting to me anyway if he had focused on the issue of the U.S. as
imperialist, although even those debates generally recognize the vast difference between old
world empire and the nature of empire in a modern world-system. At any rate, if I ever had any
temptation to refer to America as a “new Rome,” it has now been eradicated effectively.
Elizabeth Seale
Department of Sociology
State University of New York College at Oneonta
sealeek@oneonta.edu