Entire Volume 17 issue 1 - Journal of World-Systems Research ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

HYDROPOLITICAL COMPLEXES AND POWER 226 member-states of hydropolitical complexes, if it is in their interests to promote cooperation versus conflict. Although external power has many dimensions, magnitudes, and measures, this study uses the change in total trade plus aid from external sources (external to the hydropoltical complex) to indicate the foreign interference effect. Additional contributing factors include economic inequality, ethnic conflict, and the level of dependence on the shared-water source (what percentage of a country’s water comes from that water source alone). Economic inequality. The level of economic inequality between the riparians within a hydropolitical complex affects the utility of different types of leverage. For example, if there is a high level of economic inequality, measured as the disparity in GDP per capita between states, economic leverage such as trade and aid might be more effective. Ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict may disrupt or distort the negotiation process of establishing water-sharing agreements. Ethnic conflict also destroys infrastructure, absorbs resources, and generates opportunity costs that affect the possibilities for cooperation in watersharing policies. Ethnic conflict is measured as the events of ethnic conflicts that report human injuries, as documented by the Correlates of War database. Dependence on the shared river. The level of dependence on the shared river also affects conflict and cooperation. Some riparians may be more dependent on one water source, whereas other riparians may have access to alternative water resources. For example, Egypt is almost entirely dependent on the Nile for its water. Therefore, Egypt may be more likely to heighten the intensity of conflict in order to maintain its dominance in the hydropolitical complex and its control over water-sharing policies. The level of dependence on the shared river is measured as the amount of water extracted from the river as a percent of total water use, which is documented as data by UNESCO and UN-Water. It is important to reiterate that the measurements of the variables are interval data, which are appropriate for regression analysis. Most of the variables measure change, to indicate the leveraging of types of power rather than the static levels of power, except for geographic power. More information about the indicators, measurements, and data sources can be found in the variable chart in Appendix I. The temporal dynamics of the variables in the CSTS analysis are also informative, as the correlations alone do not demonstrate the direction of causality. For example, an increase in economic leverage, such as market access, may be correlated with an increase in cooperation between riparians in the hydropolitical complex, but the correlation does not determine whether the increase in market access promoted hydropolitical cooperation or the hydropolitical cooperation facilitated an increase in market access. The element of time in the CSTS and the original data must be reviewed to determine whether change in the independent variable precedes change in the dependent variable. Recall, time order is assumed for this analysis because the data are structured in chronological time-series panels with panel-corrected standard errors. This study focuses on factors that contribute to cooperation in hydropolitical complexes and negotiating water-sharing policies, thus, it analyzes the correlations in which changes in the use of political, structural, geographical, ideational, and economic leverage precede changes in the level of conflict or cooperation in international river systems.
227 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH RESULTS Table 1. The Effects of Specific Types of Leverage on Cooperation versus Conflict in Hydropolitical Complexes Regressor Type of Leverage Used by Weakest Riparian EQ1 Outcome EQ2 Sustained Geographic .81* Conflict Military .27* Qualified Negotiation .09 No Political .04 Economic .11* Negotiation .01 Yes Technological .08* Negotiation .01 Yes External .73* Negotiation .28* Yes Incentive .39* Negotiation .07* Yes Constraint .07 Economic Inequality .19* Qualified Negotiation .09 No Ethnic Conflict .22* Conflict Basin Dependence .40* Conflict Number 102 31 R-square .57 .38 Regressor Type of Leverage Used by Strongest Riparian EQ3 Outcome EQ4 Sustained Geographic .68* Conflict Military .43* Qualified Negotiation .02 No Political .19* Qualified Negotiation .01 No Economic .17* Negotiation .09 Yes Technological .09* Negotiation .01 Yes External .01 Incentive .33* Negotiation .01 No Constraint .09 Economic Inequality .08* Qualified Negotiation .01 No Ethnic Conflict .21* Conflict Basin Dependence .23* Conflict Number 102 18 R-square .49 .21
Page 1 and 2:
Journal of World-Systems Research V
Page 3 and 4:
James Rice—New Mexico State Unive
Page 5 and 6:
BOOK REVIEW ESSAY 236 Review Essay:
Page 7 and 8:
INTRODUCTION: THE WORLD-HISTORICAL
Page 9 and 10:
3 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
11 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARC
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY & THE CU
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT OF WORLD H
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
101 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEAR
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
ECOLOGY, CAPITAL, AND THE NATURE OF
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
Richard York Department of Sociolog
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
Page 161 and 162:
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Page 167 and 168:
Page 169 and 170:
Page 171 and 172:
EXTERNALITY AND INCORPORATION IN TH
Page 173 and 174:
Page 175 and 176:
Page 177 and 178:
Page 179 and 180:
Page 181 and 182: 175 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEAR
Page 205 and 206: FIVE CENTURIES OF REGIONAL DEVELOPM
Page 231: 225 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEAR
Page 283 and 284:
show all

Entire Volume 17 issue 1 - Journal of World-Systems Research ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?