Entire Volume 17 issue 1 - Journal of World-Systems Research ...

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Table 1 Continued… Notes: HYDROPOLITICAL COMPLEXES AND POWER 228 Central tendency and dispersion for x
229 JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH will become more consequential. International influence will be a significant factor in promoting cooperation or provoking conflict in hydropolitical complexes, which affects regional stability and international security. The results indicate the leverages and strategies used by weak and strong riparians, the outcomes of conflict or negotiated settlements, and the sustainability of the negotiated settlements. Structural and Hard Power Geographic Leverage. In all cases in the study, the country with the geographic advantage asserted it. This is not surprising. If a country controls the headwaters or the upriver point of contention, it uses the geographic advantage as leverage over other countries that may have an advantage in political power, military might, or economic dominance. Ethiopia, for example, is no match for the political, military, and economic prowess of Egypt, but Ethiopia controls the water upriver from Egypt on the Nile. Thus, Ethiopia has at least one powerful bargaining chip, and uses it in times of extreme scarcity; although this test of Egypt’s resolve has not been pushed to the point of escalating conflict. The future power plays of Ethiopia and Sudan with Egypt, as well as plausible riparian alliances, is receiving an increasing amount of scholarly attention (Klare 2001) but has yet to produce a source of hard power that trumps the military hard power or economic “sticky” power of Egypt. The problem verified in this study, however, is that asserting geographic leverage results in conflict in almost all cases. In the case of the Nile, when Ethiopia asserts its geographic advantage, Egypt responds by increasing its political pressure, military threats, and economic leverage, which often exacerbate conflict rather than promote cooperation. In sum, geographic leverage is statistically significant because the riparians that have the geographic advantage use it, but the use of geographic leverage is highly correlated with conflict, not cooperation. Military Strategy. Countries will mobilize their militaries to protect access to vital water resources. Part of the objective of hydropolitical security complexes is to minimize the need for military mobilization around contentious water issues, and to promote cooperation between interdependent states in international river systems. The results of this research demonstrate that many negotiations over water-sharing policies are qualified negotiated settlements, which indicates that a form of military leverage such as threats or mobilization preceded negotiations. This suggests that the application of military leverage can bring both sides to the negotiation table because military threats, mobilization and use of force are not generally ignored, especially if the military power of the weaker riparian is asserted through terrorist attacks or backed by external military capacity. Other types of leverage such as economic constraints can be neglected while time passes, even if the initial water-sharing dispute is not resolved. The problem with bringing riparians to the negotiating table by threatening or mobilizing military options, is that the subsequent settlements are not sustainable. Sticky Power Economic Leverage. Weak riparians use economic leverage to achieve negotiated settlements on water-sharing policies, and the negotiated settlements are sustainable for at least a year. This can be explained, in part, by the reality that market access is highly coveted. The promise to increase
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James Rice—New Mexico State Unive
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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY 236 Review Essay:
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INTRODUCTION: THE WORLD-HISTORICAL
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ECOLOGY, CAPITAL, AND THE NATURE OF
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EXTERNALITY AND INCORPORATION IN TH
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