Implementation of IPOA/IUU - International MCS Network

59and management measures adopted by that RFMO and, in exchange, would beconsidered eligible for access to some portion of the fishery resources under thepurview of the RFMO.Ultimately, however, “cooperating” status may be more effective andequitable if it is implemented as a temporary arrangement, pending fullmembership by all those with a real interest in the fishery and that are eligible tojoin the RFMO. Otherwise, “cooperating” status could evolve into a sort ofpermanent second-class condition that would not necessarily benefit either theRFMO or those with such status.Another way in which RFMOs could strengthen their institutionalregimes would be to re-examine their decision-making procedures to ensure thatdecisions concerning IUU fishing can be made promptly and consistently. 119 Forexample, most RFMOs have one annual plenary meeting (along with a growingnumber of intersessional meetings often used to deal with specific projects).Incidents of IUU fishing, however, can occur at any time of the year and mayrequire a quick response by a RFMO and its members. To address thiscircumstance, members of RFMOs may need to authorize RFMO secretariats tobe proactive in dealing with individual incidents of IUU fishing; e.g. by sendingimmediate notifications to relevant States and helping with MCS activity.RFMOs may also wish to consider the relationship between IUU fishingand the use of objection procedures. In this regard, a number of RFMOs wereestablished by treaties that give each member the right to lodge objections todecisions taken by those RFMOs within a certain period of time after theadoption of the decision. Such objections typically free the objecting memberfrom any obligation to abide by the decision in question. Further, the filing of anobjection by one member usually allows other members additional time in whichto file objections of their own to the same measure. 120While it may be inappropriate or impractical in the near-term to amendthe various treaties to limit or eliminate such objections, RFMOs couldnevertheless consider steps to minimize the possibility that the filing ofobjections will undermine the integrity of their measures and lead to IUU –particularly unregulated – fishing. For example, the RFMOs could adopt119 Cf. article 10(j) of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (“In fulfilling their obligationto cooperate through subregional or regional fisheries management organizations orarrangements, States shall ... agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate theadoption of conservation and management measures in a timely and effective manner.”).See also paragraph 82.2 of the IPOA-IUU.120 For further discussion on objection procedures and other issues relating to the ways inwhich RFMOs make decisions, see “A Review of Options for Making Decisions toConserve and Manage Pacific Fish Stocks,” prepared by the Center for InternationalEnvironmental Law.