An alternative <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> above is <strong>to</strong> rely upon <strong>in</strong>ternational law for relief. Some legalcommenta<strong>to</strong>rs have argued that MNCs are caught by <strong>the</strong> reach of <strong>in</strong>ternational lawbecause <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>in</strong>ternational legal personality, which can be def<strong>in</strong>ed as an entitycapableof possess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational rights and duties and has <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>to</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its rights bybr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational claims even though <strong>the</strong>y lack state status. International jurisprudencehas traditionally favoured associat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> personality of an MNC more closely with that ofan <strong>in</strong>dividual than with that of a state. This l<strong>in</strong>k stems, for <strong>the</strong> most part, on <strong>the</strong> presumptionthat <strong>the</strong>re exists certa<strong>in</strong> state duties that are unique and cannot be fulfilled by an MNC,such as <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of public order, for example.Transplant<strong>in</strong>g human rights duties of a state on<strong>to</strong> an MNC is problematic because <strong>in</strong> sodo<strong>in</strong>g one must assume that MNCs are similar <strong>to</strong> states, and that is conceptually difficult <strong>to</strong>construct. For example, a state’s duty under <strong>in</strong>ternational treaty law is <strong>the</strong>oretically difficult<strong>to</strong> transplant <strong>to</strong> an MNC because economic, social, and cultural rights are not with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>prov<strong>in</strong>ce of corporate activity. For example, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al process, only states can ensurea person’s rights through fairness of trial. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, states and MNCs have different <strong>in</strong>terests<strong>in</strong> light of human rights. States are concerned with balanc<strong>in</strong>g its <strong>in</strong>terests versus <strong>the</strong> libertyits citizens. In contrast, for MNCs, <strong>the</strong> balance is between liberty of its <strong>in</strong>dividuals andbus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong>terests (profit). Thus, it is argued that it is far <strong>to</strong>o simplistic <strong>to</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k that atransfer of human rights obligations from a state <strong>to</strong> an MNC can ever be realised. Amore appropriate l<strong>in</strong>k would be for an MNC <strong>to</strong> assume <strong>the</strong> same responsibilities under<strong>in</strong>ternational law as a private <strong>in</strong>dividual, where an MNC’s responsibility need not extendbeyond <strong>in</strong>dividual responsibility.The difficulty with a model whereby MNCs are held <strong>to</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dividual ra<strong>the</strong>r than statestandard is that MNCs possess far greater resources, and, as a result, are <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong>have a greater impact on <strong>the</strong> liberty and rights of private <strong>in</strong>dividuals. By way of conclusion,<strong>the</strong> duties of a private <strong>in</strong>dividual as applied <strong>to</strong> an MNC are <strong>to</strong>o narrow while those of a stateare <strong>to</strong>o broad. In <strong>the</strong> absence of an alternative an attempt has been made <strong>to</strong> create a hybridtype of treaty <strong>to</strong> hold MNCs accountable for fundamental human rights obligations.48|Private Sec<strong>to</strong>r Accountability <strong>in</strong> Combat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Commercial Sexual Exploitation of <strong>Child</strong>ren
2.5 Transitions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Accountability of Human Rights Norms: Theshift from state responsibility <strong>to</strong> MNC obligation2.5.1 Theoretical orig<strong>in</strong>s of human rightsIn order <strong>to</strong> understand why an MNC may, <strong>in</strong> fact, have duties surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> human rightsof <strong>the</strong> people and communities <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y operate and market <strong>the</strong>ir product or service,it is first necessary <strong>to</strong> briefly review <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical orig<strong>in</strong>s of human rights. Although itmay seem <strong>in</strong>tuitive that <strong>the</strong> human rights obligations of a population should exist only at<strong>the</strong> state level, upon fur<strong>the</strong>r analysis it becomes clear that <strong>the</strong> existence of human rightsnorms and standards and <strong>the</strong>ir application may <strong>in</strong>deed circumvent <strong>the</strong> unilateral and rigidformulations that have been espoused with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last century.The natural rights <strong>the</strong>ory, based on <strong>the</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>gs of Locks and Hobbes, holds that <strong>the</strong> rightsof an <strong>in</strong>dividual are “<strong>in</strong>alienable” and “unalterable”, orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g from a metaphysical sourceei<strong>the</strong>r through God or human nature. Hobbes <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>the</strong> term “right” <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> politicalphilosophy as a “right of nature” stat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> right of nature is <strong>the</strong> liberty each man has<strong>to</strong> use his own power as he will himself, for <strong>the</strong> preservation of his own nature, that is <strong>to</strong>say, of his own life, and consequently of do<strong>in</strong>g anyth<strong>in</strong>g which, <strong>in</strong> his own judgment andreason, he shall conceive <strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> aptest means <strong>the</strong>reun<strong>to</strong>. Essentially for Hobbes, <strong>the</strong>state of nature presented a war of all aga<strong>in</strong>st all, where arguably, one person has <strong>the</strong> right <strong>to</strong>take someth<strong>in</strong>g, and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r person has <strong>the</strong> right <strong>to</strong> defend his property. In o<strong>the</strong>r words,everyone had <strong>the</strong> right and liberty <strong>to</strong> protect him from attack however he could.Locke had greater faith <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> civility of man and argued that natural rights stem fromGod’s creation of people as free and equal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state of nature, and that, <strong>in</strong> this condition,no one is naturally sovereign over anyone else. As such, no person should harm ano<strong>the</strong>rperson’s life, liberty or possessions. “The state of Nature,” Locke wrote, “has a law of Nature<strong>to</strong> govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mank<strong>in</strong>dwho will but consult it, that be<strong>in</strong>g all equal and <strong>in</strong>dependent, no one ought <strong>to</strong> harm ano<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong> his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” 221 The defender of <strong>the</strong>se natural rights wouldbe government, and any <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gement of this duty would lead <strong>to</strong> its removal whereby <strong>the</strong>government has threatened <strong>the</strong> life, liberty and property of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual.The idea that human be<strong>in</strong>gs are egotistical and competitive presented itself as <strong>the</strong> foundation<strong>to</strong> many philosophical arguments <strong>in</strong> favour of secur<strong>in</strong>g order via political governance. Thisrequired a social contract by which members of society had <strong>to</strong> pledge allegiance <strong>to</strong> a state<strong>in</strong> return re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> duty of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>to</strong> protect <strong>the</strong> rights of its citizens, as well asPrivate Sec<strong>to</strong>r Accountability <strong>in</strong> Combat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Commercial Sexual Exploitation of <strong>Child</strong>ren|49
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The World Congress III against Sexu