Local Governance in Timor-Leste - Secretaria de Estado da Arte e ...

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highly ambiguous term which could be used to legitimise [Western] intervention inthe internal management of recipient states" (2006: 64). This is particularlyproblematic when attempting to measure or assess the impact of institutional change(Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 62-63). Crillo (2006) agrees, noting that goodgovernance "has no 'natural' meaning, but rather that meaning is attributed by thosewho wield the concept. Governance simply means 'manner of governance'. The 'good'part essentially refers to liberal government institutions and free-market capitalism"(Cirillo, 2006: 16). These problems are also reflected in concerns around theconditionality of development aid on good governance. Aid watchdog The Reality ofAid, for example, argues that "donors take an 'Alice in Wonderland' approach togovernance, so that it means whatever a donor wants it to mean" (Randel et al., 2004:9), adding that "many in the South… are asking whether the donor concerns for 'good'governance are no more than repackaged structural adjustment programmes" (Randelet al., 2004: 11). These criticisms all point to the practical issues that arise whenapplying ambiguous understandings of good governance, particularly in highlypoliticised environments such as those surrounding international interventions.Further, the introduction of formal democratic institutions does not guarantee thatthese institutions will be effective, nor does it assist in anticipating the consequencesof these institutions as they are incorporated into the local political environment. AsDror notes, formal democratic institutions "may function quite differently [to theirformal intent], depending on the cultures and other specific characteristics ofparticular countries – mainly historical and cultural, but also related to the size andcomposition of populations, ethnic and religious structures, and traditional lifestyles"(2001: 20). This insight is also shared by Corothers when he states:Democracy promoters have discovered that state institutions, as a general matter, arehard to change. Each institution is an entrenched subculture of its own, and resistanceto reform is common to most of them… aid to state institutions, more than any otherarea of democracy assistance, often goes for formalistic activities that float on thesurface of the recipient societies (1999: 200-201).Concerns surrounding the impact of institutional interventions are not limited to theirdemonstrable inefficiency. Situations where institutionalisation is 'successful' are49
equally problematic, as this success is often gained at the expense of those who are tobe 'developed'. This has been the case in many developing states, and is also apparentin the treatment of indigenous communities in developed states, such as theAboriginal communities of Australia. As Scott rightly notes:Contemporary development schemes, whether in Southeast Asia or elsewhere,require the creation of state spaces where the government can reconfigure the societyand economy of those who are to be 'developed'. The transformation of peripheralnonstate spaces into state spaces by the modern, developmentalist nation-state isubiquitous and, for the inhabitants of such spaces, frequently traumatic (1998: 187).Other theorists have taken these critiques even further, investigating the overall costsof democratisation on a developing state—costs that the state is then left to pick up(Davis, 2008, Bates, 2006, Polterovich and Popov, 2007, Mansfield and Snyder,1995a). In their study into democratisation, institutional quality and economic growth,Polterovich and Popov argue that there is a measurable cost to democratisation interms of economic growth and human security. This, they argue, runs counter to "theconventional wisdom…that these tradeoffs do not exist or that democracycomplements economic growth and other development goals" (Polterovich andPopov, 2007: 72). These costs and tradeoffs are not insubstantial and are not limitedto slower economic growth: in the wrong cultural environment with poor institutionalstructures and ethnic divisions, democratic transitions can be strongly linked toofficial corruption, higher crime rates and ethnic violence (Polterovich and Popov,2007: 74). Mansfield and Snyder echo these concerns, noting that democratisation canhave the effect of "widening the political spectrum to include too many irreconcilablepolitical forces" (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995b: 90) as the power play with newdemocratising elites attempting to consolidate their position and old elites attemptingto re-establish their position within the new regime can result in violent conflict(Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a). By contrast, Bates gives an optimistic view of therelationship between political accountability and growth. However, he nonethelesshighlights that the shift to competitive elections heightens political disorder that canbe detrimental to growth (Bates 2006). While these positions give differing accountsof the impact of democratisation, they each demonstrate that the chain of equivalencethat is embedded within much good governance discourse skates over underlying50
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Local Governance in Timor-Leste:The
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COPYRIGHT STATEMENT‘I hereby gran
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are some important points of tensio
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the Canossian sisters in Ainaro—M
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2.6 The Issues of Cross-Cultural Re
Page 11 and 12: LIST OF FIGURESFigure One: The Deve
Page 13 and 14: Tara banduUma kainUma lulikXefe Ald
Page 15 and 16: within, I had failed to recognise t
Page 17 and 18: anthropology of development (Shephe
Page 19 and 20: prefer the term 'local' to recognis
Page 21 and 22: evolve around ideas of traditional
Page 23 and 24: institution that is considered to b
Page 25 and 26: the case given the emphasis on cond
Page 27 and 28: Within these increasingly murky pol
Page 29 and 30: 1.3 Case Study SitesVenilaleVenilal
Page 31 and 32: The reasons for choosing Venilale a
Page 33 and 34: and influences can have on the loca
Page 35 and 36: played out since decolonisation. Th
Page 37 and 38: geographically 'outwards' from uma
Page 39 and 40: CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWO
Page 41 and 42: 2.1 FieldworkFieldwork was conducte
Page 43 and 44: marked differences in people's idea
Page 45 and 46: interactions between modern and tra
Page 47 and 48: then asking for advice on who else
Page 49 and 50: answer specific questions about how
Page 51 and 52: Every conversation and every experi
Page 53 and 54: discussions. This took a little tim
Page 55 and 56: crucial to the research question—
Page 57 and 58: CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUALISING POST
Page 59 and 60: epresentation through democratisati
Page 61: of coordination between these diffe
Page 65 and 66: government, and Huntington noted th
Page 67 and 68: Westernise. Equally, the specificit
Page 69 and 70: which individuals both shape and ar
Page 71 and 72: expanded this understanding to incl
Page 73 and 74: within a society. As Remmer puts it
Page 75 and 76: is to distribute power to some and
Page 77 and 78: To explain this point, he makes the
Page 79 and 80: provided by public policy" (Fukuyam
Page 81 and 82: Gramsci's account of hegemonic powe
Page 83 and 84: From this perspective, Gramsci's id
Page 85 and 86: outcomes. Rather, it structures soc
Page 87 and 88: 'shadow side' of the everyday polit
Page 89 and 90: The centrality of these kin-based g
Page 91 and 92: 4.1 Formation of Political Hybridit
Page 93 and 94: While the rule of the liurai was in
Page 95 and 96: to be rejoined. But as local politi
Page 97 and 98: in Europe, this was seen somewhat d
Page 99 and 100: did not make life any easier for th
Page 101 and 102: governor, but slowly seats were inc
Page 103 and 104: The movement towards decolonisation
Page 105 and 106: As the politics reached gradually b
Page 107 and 108: appointed traditionally (Ospina and
Page 109 and 110: esistance to Indonesian rule (Gunn
Page 111 and 112: outrage across the world. Following
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f) To assist in the establishment o
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egan to return from their hiding pl
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for a Constituent Assembly (CA) and
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these other factors reveal a more c
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SECTION TWO: EXAMINING LOCAL GOVERN
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hold spiritual and ritual responsib
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Important exchange relationships th
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spiritual significance of the ances
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ight to freedom, for anyone to occu
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The centrality of the liurai house
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As discussed previously, one of the
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order to meet their communal requir
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community, or communal expectations
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within the suku and to lead the kon
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epresentative. These political mech
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structural issue: while the old ins
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democratisation has been seen to er
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Party politics has been one such po
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on the leaders' position within the
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Within this hybrid political enviro
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in the community. While there is a
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authority figures in the aldeia, su
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As fieldwork progressed, it became
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kain), it is taken to the xefe and/
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process, they have the right to go
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(March, 2008). In the absence of le
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explains, he will not engage with a
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this distinction. When I asked abou
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insufficient attention being paid t
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of barlake that lay in the alliance
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functional, leaving them especially
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affiliation with political parties.
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xefe suku explained that the cost o
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that there is a combination of soci
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SECTION THREE: SHAPING LOCAL GOVERN
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automatically become part of the lo
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ecent Shadow Report to CEDAW, which
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Governance must be for something, a
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power within Timorese communities.
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Such structural constraints, howeve
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Across every suku in Venilale and A
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was built for their most remote ald
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While community members may attempt
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networks that use such animistic ri
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strongman, who operated in Venilale
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the community are captured or diver
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strongman specifically uses institu
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CHAPTER EIGHT: BRINGING IT BACK TO
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communities have created various fo
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However, while incoming resources c
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of fundamental importance in consid
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEESVEN
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF TIMOR-LESTESourc
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APPENDIX D: POLITICAL MAP OF SUBDIS
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BINNS, T. (2006) 'Doing Fieldwork i
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CHESTERMAN, S. (2002) 'East Timor i
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DEGNBOL-MARTINUSSEN, J. (2002) 'Dev
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Lincoln, Y. (Eds.) The Landscape of
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GRENFELL, L. (2006) 'Legal Pluralis
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HOWARTH, D. (2000) Discourse, Bucki
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LANDMAN, T. & HAUSERMANN, J. (2003)
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MERRY, S. E. (1988) 'Legal Pluralis
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OSPINA, S. & HOHE, T. (2001) Tradit
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RUDOLPH, L. I. (1965) 'The Modernit
Page 241 and 242:
THAKUR, R. & VAN LANGENHOVE, L. (20
Page 243:
WORK, R. (2002) 'Overview of Decent
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