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PIATAKOV: A MIRROR OF SOVIET HISTORY 111If, from Piatakov's standpoint, 1921 could be seen in some ways underthe banner of continuity, the autumn of 1923, on the other hand, marked avery important rupture, caused by a series of simultaneous events, namely:the failure of the revolution in Germany; the scissors crisis; the formal birthof the opposition; and the first serious conflicts over the direction of largestate industry (we should remember that Piatakov was at that time the vicepresidentof the VSNKh, with executive powers).After the Ruhr crisis and the explosion of hyper-inflation, all of theSoviet leaders, including Trotsky and his followers, had great expectationsfor Germany. Piatakov and Radek, in particular, were sent to strengthen theleadership of the German party. In fact, since it was believed that the objectiveconditions in Germany were "ripe" for socialism, the general agreementwas that the seizure of power there was essentially a question ofcorrect "subjective" action and thus necessitated a strong leadership. Butthe newly arrived Radek and Piatakov found themselves faced with a partyunable to organize or manage the insurrection, and thus supported its recall.The disappointment was great and, given the premises, reflections on thecauses for the failure were founded exclusively on subjective considerations.The defeat was explained by resorting, on the one hand, to the subjectivemistakes of the Communists and, on the other, to the behavior of theSocial Democrats, who at the crucial moment had sided with the "fascists"(this was the term Radek, Piatakov, and Trotsky used to define the new Germangovernment in 1923) or had proved to be "fascists" themselves (as,apparently, Zinov'ev stated). After the stage marked by the trial of theSocialist Revolutionaries, the nascent theory of social-fascism thus made adecisive step forward—in the documents of both the opposition and itsfuture allies.To these motivations Piatakov himself added a profound pessimismabout the revolutionary social "subjects"—the Western proletariat in generaland the Russian one in particular—which he felt had entered a longseason of passivity. This pessimism made him famous: Serge, Pascal, andMikoian spoke of it, the latter making fun of it; and, formally, it marked thedeath of the hope that the revolution in Europe would come to justify fromoutside and aposteriori the October miracle. Especially among those whohad viewed the latter as theoretical nonsense, awareness of the fragility ofSoviet power now reached unprecedented heights. And the sense ofurgency, of the "must be done," was now felt more tragically. It gave a particularcolor to the famous debate on industrialization, sharpening dissentwithin the Soviet leadership.academic) in the then and distortion of Shliapnikov's ideas.