Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian ... - alnap

IA RTE of the humanitarian response to Pakistan’s 2010 Floods crisis
75. Considering the scale of the disaster, the overall geographical coverage was expectedly
limited, but too focused on accessible areas. Humanitarian assistance was mostly concentrated
in larger towns and areas that were more accessible such as the Peshawar Valley, Charsadda
and Mansehra in KPK, or Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh districts in Punjab. Smaller communities or
entire areas in the same provinces received significantly less or no attention at all. Most people
interviewed mentioned that assistance was proportionally larger in KPK and Punjab than in
Sindh. Coordination within and in‐between clusters was not instrumental in enhancing a clearer
division of labour among organisations to ensure a more comprehensive coverage, clearer
prioritisation or rationalised relief efforts. Initially, duplications were reported in some areas,
but were generally dealt with at district coordination levels.
76. The situation on the ground changed continuously making it a challenge for the
humanitarian community to adapt to changing needs in terms of contiguum of relief and early
recovery as well fast changing locations, primarily due to movements of flood affected. In
comparison to Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh, humanitarian actors in KPK, who were already
organised around the PDMA/PAARSA structures and working with experienced implementing
partners,were in a better situation to anticipate and adapt to changing needs. The GoP also
differed somehow from UN with regards to the emergency’s different stages considering the
different phases to be much clearly divided. This meant that in some cases the transition from
relief to recovery was not understood in the same way.
77. At the provincial level, the response capacity varied substantially and successes depended
largely on the proportions of damage, the government structures in place and the presence of
international and national organisations.
78. Another dimension that needs to be considered is that the procurement and logistics
pipelines were significantly disrupted. Stocks of nationally‐produced relief items (Pakistan
produces some 85% of the world’s emergency tents shelter) had been shipped to Haiti and not
replenished. When the floods hit, the production capacity and distribution channels were
heavily disrupted. Only those humanitarian organisations that had national and regional
contingency stocks, such as the ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO, could immediately
respond 31 .
Staff capacities and turn‐over
79. The existing human resource capacity and competency was overstretched. The response
was also heavily constrained by insufficient surge capacity as resources had been depleted to
other disasters, particularly the Haiti earthquake. Those human resources that were mobilised,
particularly during the initial stages, often lacked leadership skills to effectively carry out
31
This despite the fact that WFP had significant contingency stocks damaged during the floods.
Riccardo Polastro, Aatika Nagrah, Nicolai Steen and Farwa Zafar
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