Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian ... - alnap

IA RTE of the humanitarian response to Pakistan’s 2010 Floods crisis
crisis and epidemic outbreak. Within weeks the humanitarian response became the largest
emergency operation ever staged by humanitarian community.
Nonetheless, even if the humanitarian community initially managed to scale up the response,
resources were soon stretched to the limit due to the sheer scale and geographical spread of the
disaster, compounded by a general lack of preparedness, especially in Sindh and Punjab
Provinces. The response was further constrained by insufficient surge capacity of qualified
resources and high turnover of international staff.
Timing, resources and geography has made it difficult to assess adequately the needs across the
affected areas. Joint assessments, such as the MCRAM, were used to some extent but did not
prevent most actors (and clusters) to run their own assessments. The needs assessments were
more for individual agency use than for use by the broader humanitarian community. Multiple
single agency assessments and a lack of common criteria for needs assessments have also
meant that humanitarian partners have been unable to jointly prioritize interventions. It was
also found that assessments would have benefited from including more disaggregated data by
age, gender or vulnerability. There was a general lack of consolidated information and relief and
early recovery activities were therefore largely provided in an uncoordinated manner, based on
organizational priorities and assumptions of what the affected population needs. Although the
response slowly adapted to changing needs, it initially ran behind challenges and was generally
poorly prioritized and largely supply driven rather than needs based.
A principled approach and independent needs based response was often missing due to
interference, primarily at local levels from politicians, landlords or tribal leaders, but also due to
limited access. Coverage of assistance was limited due to the sheer scale of the disaster, but
where assistance was provided it was not proportionate and adapted to needs; there were
cases where aid mainly reached people that were locally well positioned and/or aligned to
political parties. These factors, combined with access issues in conflict affected areas meant that
the humanitarian space often was compromised.
The experiences from the Pakistani floods clearly show the need to adapt the response to the
context and conditions on the ground. While international standards serve as guidelines for
what should be achieved, it is clear to all parties that given the extent of the disaster it was
difficult to follow such standards and guidelines. Sometimes military assets were used where
civilian assets were insufficient and physical access constrained. A common position across the
agencies with regards to use of military assets was absent, despite having adapted earlier in
2010 a set of country specific guidelines for civil‐military interventions. In areas such as
Balochistan and KPK, where the government or regional actors are party to the conflict, military
assets should not be used.
Initially four clusters (food, health, WASH and shelter + support services such as telecom and
logistics) have been rolled out for life saving activities in Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan,
following the request of the GoP, while in KPK they were already active. Generally these clusters
have been praised for the assistance provided, despite the challenges they were all facing as a
Riccardo Polastro, Aatika Nagrah, Nicolai Steen and Farwa Zafar
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