Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian ... - alnap

IA RTE of the humanitarian response to Pakistan’s 2010 Floods crisis
result of the magnitude of the needs, but within weeks all clusters were rolled out. The
relevance and appropriateness of this ‘verbatim’ roll out of clusters has been unanimously
questioned by the GoP, donors and implementing partners, the main reasons being that the
clusters were operating independently from contextual realities and to a large extent also to the
phases of the operation. At the national, and consequently at provincial levels, clusters were not
always aligned with recovery planning and efforts, dictated by line departments or other
national authorities.
The HC, HCT and clusters lacked strong leadership and strategic prioritization. UN’s relationship
with national authorities and counterparts was characterised by diverging views both on how to
approach the emergency situation as well as leadership and accountability. The UN as well as
other stakeholders involved in response did not have a common stand. Cluster leads generally
favoured their own agencies’ interests rather than the sector priorities. Often cluster leads were
not trained and ignored their responsibilities. Nevertheless, co‐leadership both at national and
district level was considered positive, when clusters were rolled out at district level clusters
contributed to avoid duplications.
In the most affected provinces, government structures were distant from areas where
humanitarian response concentrated. In Punjab and Sindh most humanitarian actors were
present in the hubs rather than in provincial capitals, which contributed to reinforced capacity
among local NGOs and authorities. Initially their presence was justified, and largely praised, as
coordination was brought closer to relief operations. Despite seeing most flood‐affected
population leaving camps and settlements between October and November, the overall
response has only now officially moved into recovery and reconstruction although except from
so‐called residual relief areas in Sindh. This also means that the decentralized hubs in Punjab
and Sindh are losing momentum and decision making processes needs to be integrated in the
existing provincial government structures.
The information flow was massive but with limited strategic use. Only few clusters had common
reporting formats and information was therefore not consolidated. OCHA, together with NDMA,
has been working on rolling out a standardized single reporting format with clearly defined
targets and indicators since the onset of the disaster. Nonetheless, the format was only posted
online in mid January 2011. This has meant that key humanitarian actors could not obtain a
strategic overview of the response and prioritize assistance within and across clusters.
Integrated information for monitoring results and accountability towards population, peers and
donors is still missing.
Most of the international response focused on relief rather than on recovery activities.
Strategies related to early recovery, recovery and rehabilitation were not carefully and timely
planned for by most clusters, as requirements from NDMA and OCHA were inconsistent and
changed over time. To date recovery has been dealt with from a cluster perspective rather than
a more integrated fashion. Furthermore, to draw an integrated recovery strategy a common
understanding of the different emergency phases is needed. The floods again brought to the
surface underlying issues related to land rights and women’s rights. While the land property
remains unchanged, some corrective measures have been implemented (food distribution,
Riccardo Polastro, Aatika Nagrah, Nicolai Steen and Farwa Zafar
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