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Sixth Semiannual Report to the Congress - Federal Housing ...
Sixth Semiannual Report to the Congress - Federal Housing ...
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Even though the FHFA senior examiner raised<br />
concerns about Freddie Mac’s loan review<br />
process more than six months before the agency<br />
approved the Bank of America settlement, FHFA<br />
did not timely act on or test the ramifications<br />
of the examiner’s concerns before approving the<br />
settlement. Instead, the agency relied on the<br />
enterprise’s analysis of the settlement without testing<br />
its underlying assumptions. 168<br />
After we issued our report, Freddie Mac changed<br />
its loan review process for repurchase claims. The<br />
enterprise now reviews all nonperforming loans<br />
originated between 2004 and 2007 for repurchase<br />
claims without regard to when they defaulted. We<br />
found in a follow-up report that such an expanded<br />
review may generate as much as $3.4 billion in<br />
additional revenue for Freddie Mac. 169<br />
Going forward, FHFA has generally agreed with our<br />
recommendations to take a more proactive oversight<br />
stance in response to the issues our work has raised.<br />
We believe these positive steps will help the agency<br />
identify and manage risks, but we have also found<br />
that this must be accompanied by a steadfast will to<br />
enforce compliance.<br />
Enforce: Ensuring Regulatory Compliance<br />
Even when FHFA has identified risks and<br />
taken steps to manage them, the agency has not<br />
consistently enforced its directives to ensure that<br />
identified risks are, in fact, adequately addressed.<br />
As conservator and regulator, the agency’s authority<br />
over the enterprises is broad and includes the ability<br />
to enforce compliance with agency mandates.<br />
We have reported that FHFA’s supervision and<br />
regulation of the GSEs could be strengthened by<br />
better exercising this authority when warranted.<br />
For example, we determined that FHFA had<br />
not compelled Fannie Mae to comply with the<br />
requirement to have an effective program to manage<br />
operational risk—i.e., the risk of loss resulting from<br />
failed people, processes, systems, or external events.<br />
Effective operational risk management can help<br />
agency examiners to identify trends in such risks and<br />
focus their examinations accordingly. 170<br />
Between 2006 and early 2011, FHFA and its<br />
predecessor agency repeatedly identified Fannie<br />
Mae’s lack of an acceptable operational risk<br />
management program. But, as Figure 28 (see below)<br />
Figure 28. Supervisory Identification of Fannie Mae’s Operational Risk Management Deficiencies<br />
May 2006<br />
FHFA's predecessor<br />
agency's consent<br />
order: implement<br />
operational risk plan<br />
in three years<br />
March 2009<br />
FHFA’s examination<br />
of Fannie Mae:<br />
operational<br />
management<br />
oversight an area of<br />
“significant concern”<br />
May 2009<br />
FHFA’s review of<br />
Fannie Mae results<br />
in three MRAs for<br />
operational risk<br />
March 2010<br />
FHFA’s report of<br />
examination identifies<br />
ongoing operational<br />
risk and management<br />
deficiencies<br />
April 2011<br />
FHFA’s Fannie Mae<br />
examination finds<br />
noncompliance with<br />
2006 consent order<br />
re: operational risk<br />
2006<br />
2007<br />
2008<br />
2009<br />
2010<br />
2011<br />
September 2008<br />
FHFA’s letter to Fannie<br />
Mae re: deficiencies<br />
in operational risk<br />
management<br />
program<br />
December 2009<br />
FHFA issues analysis<br />
of deficiencies in<br />
Fannie Mae’s<br />
operational risk<br />
oversight program<br />
September 2010<br />
FHFA’s noncompliance<br />
letter re: three<br />
operational risk MRAs<br />
Semiannual Report to the Congress • April 1, 2013–September 30, 2013 63