THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

6 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA
most Shiite militias are reportedly based, 31 it was defending Sayyeda Zainab
from future threats. Likewise, other Syrian Shiite fighters such as Qassem
Fuad Khader, who was killed in the mountains north of Aleppo—nowhere
near Sayyeda Zainab—have been appropriated in the service of the shrine
narrative. 32
The reach of the Sayyeda Zainab narrative is exemplified by its ensnaring
of even the fascistic, rabidly secular Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), 33
one of Syria and Lebanon’s oldest parties. The SSNP’s platform calls for parts
of Egypt (Sinai), Turkey (Antakya and other southern regions), Kuwait, Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan to be folded into
a “Greater Syria.” In Lebanon, the party has acted as a direct proxy for the
Assad government and has been a Hezbollah ally. In the Syrian war, it has
contributed fighters to bolster Assad’s rule, as exemplified by the funeral of
party member Adham Najem, a Lebanese Shiite killed in combat. At Najem’s
funeral, the SSNP’s symbols were ignored in favor of an emphasis on his
defense of Sayyeda Zainab. Martyrdom posters pictured him against the
shrine as a backdrop, 34 his casket was draped in a banner reading “Labayk ya
Zainab,” and his grave featured a similar banner. 35
The shrine-protection narrative resonates intimately in Middle East Shiite
communities. Memories, for example, of the 2006 al-Qaeda destruction
of the al-Askari shrine (a.k.a. the Golden Mosque) in Samarra, described
as Shiite Islam’s holiest, are still fresh in Iraqi as well as broader Shiite circles.
36 In Afghanistan and Pakistan, home to large and often repressed Shiite
minorities, Sunni Islamists have launched numerous attacks against Shiite
communities, shrines, and mosques. 37
When the Sayyeda Zainab shrine was attacked by rebels in July 2013, Iran’s
foreign minister called on international organizations, particularly “Islamic
bodies,” to condemn the strike. 38 Online Shiite press organs recorded Pakistani
Shiite condemnations of the attack while noting that the shrine was
“protected [my emphasis] by hundreds of Shiite militants from Iraq and the
powerful Lebanese Hezbollah group.” 39
As the Syrian civil war continues, the Sayyeda Zainab shrine remains the
epicenter for Iran and its Iraqi and Lebanese proxies. Indeed, following major
advances by ISIS and other Sunni groups in Iraq, the shrine-defense narrative
has been revitalized and expanded. The original refrain of “Lan tusba Zainab
marratayn” (Zainab will not be captive twice) was reintroduced to cover the
Iraqi arena, and the defense of the al-Askari shrine became the rallying cry
for Shiite jihadists in Iraq. 40