THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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18 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA employed by these organizations, a number of their fighters were simultaneously also identified as being AAH members or supportive of Khamenei. Prominent examples include the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), certain fighters within the Badr Organization, and Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein (LIH). 112 Although these groups have used imagery suggesting support for al-Sadr, Badr is a solid backer of absolute velayat-e faqih. 113 Liwa Dhulfiqar’s commander has stated to the Iranian press that he too is pro–absolute velayat-e faqih. 114 LIH’s spokesperson, in an interview with Iraq’s Bas News, explained that members of the group formerly belonged to Jaish al-Mahdi and actually maintained links to AAH, not al-Sadr. 115 RRF fighter Marwan al-Asadi has simultaneously worn the patches of Lebanese Hezbollah, the RRF, and other Sadrist splinter groups. 116 AAH connections to the LAFA network groups also included fighters deployed to Liwa Dhulfiqar, such as Ammar Ammar al-Tamimi, who was photographed operating with the group in Syria and in separate photos wearing AAH uniforms. 117 (See appendix 3 for a breakdown of the LAFA network of organizations.) Fighters holding photos, posing with large billboards, or featuring Muqtada al-Sadr’s face on martyrdom posters, all while claiming to be “Sadrists,” were some of the original personnel present in Syria. In fact, a number of fighters have also attempted to demonstrate a connection to Liwa al-Youm al-Mawud (the Promised Day Brigades), the Iran-backed successor to al- Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Yet al-Sadr still appears to be neither fully toeing the Iranian line by backing Iran’s allies in Iraq nor otherwise exhibiting much support for the Shiite jihad in Syria. A key figure from Muqtada’s circle who maintained his own political organization within the Sadrist Movement was Sheikh Qasim al-Tai. In 2011, following al-Sadr’s radical line, Tai even prohibited his followers from dealing with the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. 118 Tai has also been a featured contributor to the Iranian-maintained YaZeinab.com, including writing an article on his support for velayat-e faqih. 119 Relatedly, Saudi Arabia’s al-Sharq newspaper claimed that Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA), the predominantly Iraqi Shiite brigade operating in Syria, was given its blessing for existence by the Najaf-based Tai. 120 Footage was also released of a March 2013 visit by Tai to Syria. 121 While there, he greeted and praised a number of Iraqi LAFA members, including RRF leader Ahmed Hajji Saadi. This was followed by an April announcement in which Tai claimed to represent the Sadrist Movement and endorsed sending forces from Iraq to Syria to protect the shrine. Leaders affiliated with
CALL TO JIHAD n 19 al-Sadr contradicted Tai’s announcement, claiming he did not represent the movement. 122 The connection to Tai gives an additional layer of explanation for the reports of so many “Sadrists” finding their way into Shiite Islamist militant organizations in Syria. The connection underlines the likelihood that these combatants, despite the imagery they have posted, have not been acting on al-Sadr’s orders. Instead, the images were likely used deliberately either to suggest al-Sadr-controlled forces or to indicate less specific support for the Sadrist Movement. The use of the Sadrist Movement’s Sheikh Auws al-Khafaji further underscores Iran’s willingness to work with Sadrist splinters, no matter their links to al-Sadr or their members’ previous criticisms of Tehran. In 2004, Khafaji publicly criticized Iranian influence within Iraq. 123 He also commanded a leading position within Sadrist ranks and the Mahdi Army in clashes with U.S. forces during the Iraq war. 124 Despite his earlier comments, he was heavily employed by Tehran to draw support away from al-Sadr, confuse Iraqi Shiites about al-Sadr’s true position over the conflict, and win recruits for the war in Syria. Al-Sadr had distanced himself from Khafaji a number of times since 2012, after the sheikh had engaged in his own political activities against al-Sadr’s wishes. 125 In spring of 2014, the sheikh visited Damascus accompanied by RRF members sporting patches featuring al-Sadr’s face. 126 Later, as the conflict in Iraq intensified, Khafaji established a Shiite militia named Qaeda Quwet Abu Fadl al-Abbas (QQAFA) with the help of AAH members and other Syria veterans. The war in Syria has correspondingly facilitated Iran’s continuing efforts to usurp the legacy of highly influential radical Shiite clerics, particularly Muqtada al-Sadr’s late father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated in 1999 by Saddam Hussein and whose image has been adopted by many newer Iraq-based Shiite proxies of Iran, including AAH. 127 Similarly, in Lebanon, the “vanished” Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr often had a rocky relationship with Iranian revolutionaries such as Khomeini. Reportedly, al-Sadr also did not support absolute velayat-e faqih. 128 In fact, some have claimed Khomeinists actually killed al-Sadr. 129 Nevertheless, his image and legacy were later co-opted by Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s Khomeinists. 130 Likewise was the image appropriated of Hezbollah “spiritual advisor” Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who in his lifetime was critiqued by Iran for distancing himself from velayat-e faqih and later declaring himself a marja taqlid (source of emulation), a direct affront to Ayatollah Khamenei. 131
Page 1 and 2: THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS R
Page 3 and 4: POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD I
Page 5 and 6: C ONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 Introduct
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Page 9 and 10: 2 The Narrative of Jihad SINCE THE
Page 11 and 12: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 5 a useful
Page 13 and 14: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 7 An Open
Page 15 and 16: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 9 al-Amin,
Page 17 and 18: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 11 In a Fe
Page 19 and 20: 3 Call to Jihad: Clerical Views of
Page 21 and 22: CALL TO JIHAD n 15 During his publi
Page 23: CALL TO JIHAD n 17 direct Iranian m
Page 27 and 28: 4 Building an Army for Zainab REPRE
Page 29 and 30: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 23 mi
Page 31 and 32: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 25 re
Page 33 and 34: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 27 Re
Page 35 and 36: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 29 me
Page 37 and 38: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 31 tr
Page 39 and 40: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 33 PH
Page 41 and 42: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 35 Th
Page 43 and 44: 5 The Web of Multiplying Shiite Isl
Page 45 and 46: MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIA
Page 55 and 56: JOINING OF FRONTS n 49 In Iraq, att
Page 57 and 58: JOINING OF FRONTS n 51 members. 262
Page 59 and 60: JOINING OF FRONTS n 53 Darraji’s
Page 61 and 62: 7 Policy Recommendations AS THE UNI
Page 63 and 64: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS n 57 such na
Page 65 and 66: NOTES AND SOURCES n 59 Revolutionar
Page 67 and 68: NOTES AND SOURCES n 61 33. Hassan H
Page 69 and 70: NOTES AND SOURCES n 63 June 15, 200
Page 71 and 72: NOTES AND SOURCES n 65 79. Ibid. 80
Page 73 and 74: NOTES AND SOURCES n 67 110. “Sama
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 69 137. Mamuri
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 71 172. May 16,
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 73 205. Michael
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 75 233. Jacob Z
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 77 com/63568782
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 79 294. “Al-M
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS President Richar
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