THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

CALL TO JIHAD n 19
al-Sadr contradicted Tai’s announcement, claiming he did not represent
the movement. 122
The connection to Tai gives an additional layer of explanation for the
reports of so many “Sadrists” finding their way into Shiite Islamist militant
organizations in Syria. The connection underlines the likelihood that these
combatants, despite the imagery they have posted, have not been acting on
al-Sadr’s orders. Instead, the images were likely used deliberately either to
suggest al-Sadr-controlled forces or to indicate less specific support for the
Sadrist Movement.
The use of the Sadrist Movement’s Sheikh Auws al-Khafaji further underscores
Iran’s willingness to work with Sadrist splinters, no matter their links
to al-Sadr or their members’ previous criticisms of Tehran. In 2004, Khafaji
publicly criticized Iranian influence within Iraq. 123 He also commanded a
leading position within Sadrist ranks and the Mahdi Army in clashes with
U.S. forces during the Iraq war. 124 Despite his earlier comments, he was heavily
employed by Tehran to draw support away from al-Sadr, confuse Iraqi
Shiites about al-Sadr’s true position over the conflict, and win recruits for the
war in Syria. Al-Sadr had distanced himself from Khafaji a number of times
since 2012, after the sheikh had engaged in his own political activities against
al-Sadr’s wishes. 125 In spring of 2014, the sheikh visited Damascus accompanied
by RRF members sporting patches featuring al-Sadr’s face. 126 Later,
as the conflict in Iraq intensified, Khafaji established a Shiite militia named
Qaeda Quwet Abu Fadl al-Abbas (QQAFA) with the help of AAH members
and other Syria veterans.
The war in Syria has correspondingly facilitated Iran’s continuing efforts
to usurp the legacy of highly influential radical Shiite clerics, particularly
Muqtada al-Sadr’s late father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr,
who was assassinated in 1999 by Saddam Hussein and whose image has been
adopted by many newer Iraq-based Shiite proxies of Iran, including AAH. 127
Similarly, in Lebanon, the “vanished” Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr often had a
rocky relationship with Iranian revolutionaries such as Khomeini. Reportedly,
al-Sadr also did not support absolute velayat-e faqih. 128 In fact, some have
claimed Khomeinists actually killed al-Sadr. 129 Nevertheless, his image and
legacy were later co-opted by Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s Khomeinists. 130
Likewise was the image appropriated of Hezbollah “spiritual advisor” Grand
Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who in his lifetime was critiqued
by Iran for distancing himself from velayat-e faqih and later declaring himself
a marja taqlid (source of emulation), a direct affront to Ayatollah Khamenei. 131