THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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24 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA ing deniability required that the locations of their casualties go unreported or be kept deliberately vague. 146 Newer Iraqi Shiite proxies like KSS and HHN not only announced their presence in Syria but also asserted themselves via large funeral demonstrations for members in May and June 2013. Indeed, funerals were a main means to announce a group’s involvement in Syria or to simultaneously announce its Syria activities and very existence. While reports surfaced that other Iranian proxy groups had sent fighters to Syria, some of these organizations remained mum on their involvement until summer 2013. The Badr Organization, following the deaths of two members in July 2013, admitted its involvement in Syria and its formation of a special force there. The second trend consisted of Sadrists, most likely those belonging to splinter groups. The Sadrists present in Syria were not necessarily direct followers of Muqtada and often encompassed a group broadly subscribing to the tenets espoused by his murdered father, Muhammad Sadiq. Sadrists, who were active in the war with the United States, have been linked to Iran and its proxies, both during that earlier war and since. Indeed, Sadrist recruits for the Syrian war were politically mobilized, highly sectarian, with training experience ranging from basic to more advanced. Viewed cynically, Iran and its proxies might have been seen to recruit Sadrists as both cannon fodder and to establish deniability for its efforts to bolster Assad. Considering Iran’s tensions with Muqtada al-Sadr, fighters sent to Iran for training and equipment and then led, in part, by the IRGC and other advisors might also fuel future Sadrist splits, thereby building influence for Iran. Whatever their idiosyncratic path, Sadrists have undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the Syrian Shiite jihad. The first trickle of foreign Shiite fighters to reach Syria emerged from this strain, and according to LAFA sources, the “first martyr to fall in Sayyeda Zainab ” was Jaafar Adhab Farhud, who was killed on May 12, 2012, and buried in Diwaniyah, Iraq. 147 The placard above his tombstone, complete with images of Muqtada al-Sadr and his father, Muhammad Sadiq, says he was a “casualty of cowardly terrorists in Syria.” 148 According to an October 2012 report, members of al-Sadr’s senior leadership were deploying to Syria under the guise of pilgrimages to Sayyeda Zainab. One such individual affirmed, “When we went to Najaf, they told us it’s a call for fighting in Syria against the Salafis.” 149 It was around the same time that direct Iranian involvement in the war, through proxy forces,
BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 25 replaced the previous Shiite militia structure, whereby these militias were localized institutions with links to Syria’s army and intelligence. 150 Some Sadrist-related fighters neither fully shared Iran’s ideology nor were members of its proxy organizations. From the start of the recruitment effort in Iraq, potential fighters were first routed through Iran and then flown to Syria. In April 2013, following the return of the bodies of ten Shiite fighters killed in Syria, Iraqi officials noted the “missing link [on their passports] between when they left for Iran and when their bodies arrived in Iraq from Syria.” 151 Other younger recruits with the Badr Organization claimed they were trained in Iran over twoweek periods. 152 Following the first two main ideologically based fighter deployments, in Iraq popular committees acting as subcommittees for other organizations emerged. They often advertised ties to a parent group and would take the lead in recruitment efforts. The most active and largest of these was the PCMDSZ, which was used to recruit fighters for various Iranian proxies. The PCMDSZ focused heavily on displaying posters praising the martyrdom of Shiite fighters around Shiite holy sites. In particular, routes traveled by pilgrims in Karbala and Najaf featured phone numbers to call for those interested in defending Shiite holy sites. Recruitment in Hezbollah, by contrast, did not involve subcommittees but rather more direct entreaties by members to potential recruits. All the same, similar techniques were used to those in Iraq. Posters in Dahiya advertised phone numbers potential fighters could call to defend Sayyeda Zainab. 153 Familial Links, Scouts, and Underage Fighters Family connections and youth wings established by Iran’s Lebanese and Iraqi Shiite proxies constituted core means of recruitment for the Syrian jihad. Some of the youths who fought were indeed very young, and during the recruitment peak period of November 2013 to January 2014, slain youth combatants were actively promoted in martyrdom posters and online. Family connections are suggested by specific casualties. Hussein Ajeeb Jadha, the brother of LAFA’s leader, Abu Ajeeb, died fighting in the winter of 2012. Hamza al-Darraji, the son of LAFA leader Abu Ali al-Darraji, had both legs amputated after being seriously wounded in combat. Both Darraji and his son eventually returned to Iraq, where the family’s commitment to fighting Sunni jihadists was actively promoted as a symbol of strength and commitment.
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Page 3 and 4: POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD I
Page 5 and 6: C ONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 Introduct
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Page 9 and 10: 2 The Narrative of Jihad SINCE THE
Page 11 and 12: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 5 a useful
Page 13 and 14: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 7 An Open
Page 15 and 16: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 9 al-Amin,
Page 17 and 18: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 11 In a Fe
Page 19 and 20: 3 Call to Jihad: Clerical Views of
Page 21 and 22: CALL TO JIHAD n 15 During his publi
Page 23 and 24: CALL TO JIHAD n 17 direct Iranian m
Page 25 and 26: CALL TO JIHAD n 19 al-Sadr contradi
Page 27 and 28: 4 Building an Army for Zainab REPRE
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Page 57 and 58: JOINING OF FRONTS n 51 members. 262
Page 59 and 60: JOINING OF FRONTS n 53 Darraji’s
Page 61 and 62: 7 Policy Recommendations AS THE UNI
Page 63 and 64: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS n 57 such na
Page 65 and 66: NOTES AND SOURCES n 59 Revolutionar
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Page 79 and 80: NOTES AND SOURCES n 73 205. Michael
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 75 233. Jacob Z
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 77 com/63568782
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 79 294. “Al-M
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS President Richar
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