THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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38 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. For many years, the Badr Organization had served as a main IRGC conduit for manufacturing proxies in Iraq. According to Brian Fishman, “Before 2003, the Badr Corps [as the Badr Organization was previously known] served as Iran’s most important action arm inside Iraq, and was considered an official component of the IRGC‐QF,” with a number of the group’s members heavily involved in weapons transfers to Iraq for use against U.S. and coalition forces. 200 Only in spring 2014, as the Badr Organization’s efforts within Syria became more transparent, did the group announce on its al-Ghadeer TV network and official social media that it had attacked U.S. forces in Iraq. These attacks were used as propaganda to recruit fighters for Syria. The Badr Organization’s influence on Iraqi Shiite organizations is demonstrated in the exploitation of battlefield deaths such as that of Ali Hamza al-Darraji (Sadiqi), a KSS member who was reportedly killed on August 20, 2013. As it happens, Darraji was no volunteer recruit but rather the son of a prominent martyr, Abu Maytham al-Darraji, a Badr Brigades member whose martyrdom was celebrated in 2012 by the Badr Organization and commemorated in events marking Badr’s thirty-fifth year. 201 For the son, whose martyrdom was “claimed” by both KSS and the Badr Organization, both online and real-world commemorations are still being created. Similarly, Ali Sami al-Zubaydi (a.k.a. Abu Mujahid al-Sadiqi) was an early Syria martyr buried under the KSS banner but jointly claimed by the Badr Organization. 202 In summer 2014, Zubaydi’s legacy and martyrdom were rebranded to inspire conscription in the new Badr-linked group Harakat al-Abdel. 203 Badr ties can also be found with HTI and its Saraya Talia al-Khurasani. One of the fallen fighters claimed by the group, Shabir Hassan al-Zwain al-Zabahawi, sported the insignias of the Badr Organization’s Quwet al-Shahid Muhammad Baqir Sadr. 204 Additionally, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a resident of Baghdad’s Green Zone who advised former Iraqi prime minister Maliki as well as IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, helped found Kataib Hezbollah, and masterminded the 1983 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, himself arose from the Badr Brigades. 205 Within the proxy Kataib Hezbollah, a split was likely manufactured to give plausible deniability to a new, highly sectarian group, Jaish al-Mukhtar (Army of the Mukhtar a.k.a. Iraqi Hezbollah), 206 which is active in Iraq and reportedly sent forces to Syria. Jaish al-Mukhtar operates under the leadership of former Badr Organization member and Kataib Hezbollah leader Wathiq al- Battat, 207 who himself claimed involvement with al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army dur-
MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIAS n 39 ing the Iraq war. 208 The group’s admission to following Khamenei’s leadership and absolute velayat-e faqih strongly suggests continued links to Iran. AAH, too, was instrumental in creating spinoffs for the Syria fight. Akram Kaabi, an AAH founder and leader, was responsible for launching and leading HHN. Initially, claims suggested that Kaabi had formed another group, the Haidar al-Karrar Brigade, over a dispute with LAFA leaders over fighting in areas outside Sayyeda Zainab. 209 However, this appears to have been a cover story given that HHN has reported regularly sending fighters under its own banner to Aleppo since June 2013. Additionally, HHN still deploys forces in the vicinity of Sayyeda Zainab, namely Liwa al-Imam al-Hassan al-Mujtaba. Groups associated with Liwa Dhulfiqar, which itself split from LAFA but maintains a close relationship with the network, fought in areas throughout southern Syria. Adding further levels of absurdity to the initial claim regarding HHN’s formation, LAFA, Liwa Dhulfiqar, the RRF, AAH’s Liwa Kafil Zainab, and the Badr Organization, among others, have all reportedly been active outside the Damascus area. If anything, HHN was yet another Iranian proxy front group used to expand Tehran’s influence and recruit more fighters for Syria. While Iran’s proxies provided most organizational deployments to Syria, elements from the Sadrist Movement were also called upon to supply fighters. In the case of Liwa Dhulfiqar, the group’s commanders would intimate they had connections to the more elite, Iranian-trained and equipped Liwa al-Youm al-Mawud. Abu Ithnan al-Budairi, one of Liwa Dhulfiqar’s operational commanders, was photographed in front of a poster belonging to the group. He would affirm his links to the organization and post pictures with his family members in front of Liwa al-Youm al-Mawud posters. 210 Another source for Iran’s expanding Iraqi proxy network has been splinters associated with the Mahdi Army. These Sadrist Movement fragments helped establish AAH as well as LAFA, LIH, Liwa Dhulfiqar, and possibly the RRF. Despite imagery and claims projecting loyalty to al-Sadr, as discussed earlier, many of these groups have simultaneously claimed adherence to absolute velayat-e faqih, implying a break from al-Sadr’s tenets. Exotic Foreign Fighters Shiite fighters from outside the usual recruitment zones of Iraq and Lebanon have helped push the idea of a truly global pan-Shiite jihad in Syria. In the United States and Canada, cases were observed of Hezbollah finding
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Page 3 and 4: POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD I
Page 5 and 6: C ONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 Introduct
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Page 9 and 10: 2 The Narrative of Jihad SINCE THE
Page 11 and 12: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 5 a useful
Page 13 and 14: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 7 An Open
Page 15 and 16: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 9 al-Amin,
Page 17 and 18: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 11 In a Fe
Page 19 and 20: 3 Call to Jihad: Clerical Views of
Page 21 and 22: CALL TO JIHAD n 15 During his publi
Page 23 and 24: CALL TO JIHAD n 17 direct Iranian m
Page 25 and 26: CALL TO JIHAD n 19 al-Sadr contradi
Page 27 and 28: 4 Building an Army for Zainab REPRE
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Page 37 and 38: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 31 tr
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Page 43: 5 The Web of Multiplying Shiite Isl
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Page 57 and 58: JOINING OF FRONTS n 51 members. 262
Page 59 and 60: JOINING OF FRONTS n 53 Darraji’s
Page 61 and 62: 7 Policy Recommendations AS THE UNI
Page 63 and 64: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS n 57 such na
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Page 67 and 68: NOTES AND SOURCES n 61 33. Hassan H
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Page 73 and 74: NOTES AND SOURCES n 67 110. “Sama
Page 75 and 76: NOTES AND SOURCES n 69 137. Mamuri
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Page 79 and 80: NOTES AND SOURCES n 73 205. Michael
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Page 83 and 84: NOTES AND SOURCES n 77 com/63568782
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Page 87 and 88: BOARD OF DIRECTORS President Richar

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