THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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The Web of Multiplying Shiite
Islamist Militias in Syria
WHILE THE FLURRY of direct Iranian proxies often appear to be independent
organizations, they all follow the ideology and religious guidance of
Ayatollah Khamenei and the military lead of Iran’s IRGC and particularly
its Qods Force. Important to note in this context is that Iran also shares links
to numerous other Shiite militias, including those not adhering to absolute
velayat-e faqih. As for the direct proxies, they seem to recruit from the same
types of fighters and repeat the same narratives.
Iran’s Interconnected Proxies
A trend in the development of Iranian proxies is the creation of seemingly
new groups characterized by unified ideology and loyal, proven personnel.
These groups typically emerge either from reported “splits” from an existing
group or a commander’s changed affiliation. What appears to be atomization
within the ranks is instead more reminiscent of cell replication, with new
groups simply expanding the size and influence of a broader IRGC-created
network and model. This might be construed as a strategy to confuse outside
observers as well as demonstrate broader acceptance for Iran’s absolute
velayat-e faqih ideology. In many ways, the approach follows that pioneered
by Hezbollah, although Hezbollah fighters serve more as advisors to spinoff
groups rather than leaders or members. Nearly all the Iranian proxy groups
encompassed in this discussion can be explained as fitting a broader muqawama
al-Islamiyah (Islamic resistance) brand, and they use this term to
describe themselves. Along with projecting the same messages, these groups
cooperate openly and participate in many of the same operations.
As for these newer groups’ leaders and core members, many were culled
from established entities created by Iran, namely the Badr Organization,
which was originally the military arm for ISCI’s predecessor, the Supreme
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