THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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36 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA • a means to demonstrate official Iraqi government support for Shiite militia operations in Syria. • a tactic to overstate the presence of Iran’s proxies, groups possibly affiliated with Muqtada al-Sadr, and the influence of other Sadrist Movement splinters within official Iraqi military organs. • a direct result of the use of actual units that simultaneously served within the Iraqi security forces. • a signal to Sunni foes within Iraq and Syria that government-backed Shiite forces could deploy regionally and had superior training and equipment. • a method to show potential recruits that they would be fighting alongside well-trained units with goals and historically proven track records. Whatever the reasons, the very strong possibility exists that elements from Iraqi government forces were utilized from the start of open engagements by Iranian proxies and other Shiite organizations in Syria.
5 The Web of Multiplying Shiite Islamist Militias in Syria WHILE THE FLURRY of direct Iranian proxies often appear to be independent organizations, they all follow the ideology and religious guidance of Ayatollah Khamenei and the military lead of Iran’s IRGC and particularly its Qods Force. Important to note in this context is that Iran also shares links to numerous other Shiite militias, including those not adhering to absolute velayat-e faqih. As for the direct proxies, they seem to recruit from the same types of fighters and repeat the same narratives. Iran’s Interconnected Proxies A trend in the development of Iranian proxies is the creation of seemingly new groups characterized by unified ideology and loyal, proven personnel. These groups typically emerge either from reported “splits” from an existing group or a commander’s changed affiliation. What appears to be atomization within the ranks is instead more reminiscent of cell replication, with new groups simply expanding the size and influence of a broader IRGC-created network and model. This might be construed as a strategy to confuse outside observers as well as demonstrate broader acceptance for Iran’s absolute velayat-e faqih ideology. In many ways, the approach follows that pioneered by Hezbollah, although Hezbollah fighters serve more as advisors to spinoff groups rather than leaders or members. Nearly all the Iranian proxy groups encompassed in this discussion can be explained as fitting a broader muqawama al-Islamiyah (Islamic resistance) brand, and they use this term to describe themselves. Along with projecting the same messages, these groups cooperate openly and participate in many of the same operations. As for these newer groups’ leaders and core members, many were culled from established entities created by Iran, namely the Badr Organization, which was originally the military arm for ISCI’s predecessor, the Supreme 37
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Page 3 and 4: POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD I
Page 5 and 6: C ONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 Introduct
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Page 9 and 10: 2 The Narrative of Jihad SINCE THE
Page 11 and 12: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 5 a useful
Page 13 and 14: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 7 An Open
Page 15 and 16: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 9 al-Amin,
Page 17 and 18: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 11 In a Fe
Page 19 and 20: 3 Call to Jihad: Clerical Views of
Page 21 and 22: CALL TO JIHAD n 15 During his publi
Page 23 and 24: CALL TO JIHAD n 17 direct Iranian m
Page 25 and 26: CALL TO JIHAD n 19 al-Sadr contradi
Page 27 and 28: 4 Building an Army for Zainab REPRE
Page 29 and 30: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 23 mi
Page 31 and 32: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 25 re
Page 33 and 34: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 27 Re
Page 35 and 36: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 29 me
Page 37 and 38: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 31 tr
Page 39 and 40: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 33 PH
Page 41: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 35 Th
Page 45 and 46: MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIA
Page 55 and 56: JOINING OF FRONTS n 49 In Iraq, att
Page 57 and 58: JOINING OF FRONTS n 51 members. 262
Page 59 and 60: JOINING OF FRONTS n 53 Darraji’s
Page 61 and 62: 7 Policy Recommendations AS THE UNI
Page 63 and 64: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS n 57 such na
Page 65 and 66: NOTES AND SOURCES n 59 Revolutionar
Page 67 and 68: NOTES AND SOURCES n 61 33. Hassan H
Page 69 and 70: NOTES AND SOURCES n 63 June 15, 200
Page 71 and 72: NOTES AND SOURCES n 65 79. Ibid. 80
Page 73 and 74: NOTES AND SOURCES n 67 110. “Sama
Page 75 and 76: NOTES AND SOURCES n 69 137. Mamuri
Page 77 and 78: NOTES AND SOURCES n 71 172. May 16,
Page 79 and 80: NOTES AND SOURCES n 73 205. Michael
Page 81 and 82: NOTES AND SOURCES n 75 233. Jacob Z
Page 83 and 84: NOTES AND SOURCES n 77 com/63568782
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Page 87 and 88: BOARD OF DIRECTORS President Richar

THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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