THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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14 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA to draw both radical and more quietist Iraqi clerics and laypeople to the Iranian way of thinking. 85 In its effort, Iran has tapped clerics who attempted to convey a level of closeness to Sistani and who backed the Syrian jihad. One of these figures is Sheikh Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, the leader of Baghdad’s important Buratha Mosque. Once described as a representative for Sistani, Saghir had headed the council for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI; formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI) and led the ISCI National Iraqi Alliance in parliament. 86 He had even openly stated that it would be a “huge mistake” to impose a Khomeinist form of government in Iraq. 87 However, Saghir’s historical links with ISCI and its former military wing, the velayat-e faqih–backing Badr Organization, likely helped shape his opinions on the conflict in Syria. Under the leadership of Ammar al-Hakim, ISCI partially turned away from Iran and instead backed Sistani, going so far as to drop “Islamic Revolution” from its name and distance itself from absolute velayat-e faqih. 88 This step reportedly led the ISCI’s militia, the Badr Organization, to split off and form a new party, the Badr Organization. 89 Additionally, the ISCI has not publicly announced that it has sent any fighters to Syria. Despite these changes, Saghir maintained links to Badr and fully backed the Shiite jihad in Syria. Since Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s fall, Saghir, whose mosque was bombed in 2006 by Sunni jihadists, has also espoused a more hostile public view of Sunnis than most of his ISCI compatriots. 90 In 2007, his mosque was raided by Iraqi government forces over accusations it was used as a base for Shiite death squads. 91 Demonstrating his sights were focused on Syria as a potentially new sectarian battlefront, Saghir was quoted by Al-Arabiya in April 2011 saying, “We have to take into consideration that Iraq would be the most affected by instability in Syria.” 92 By May 2013, Saghir had already taken to the pulpit and extolled Shiites fighting ostensibly to defend Sayyeda Zainab. 93 In January 2014, in another public demonstration of support, Saghir announced via his official web page that he had visited Shiite fighters wounded in Syria being treated in an Iranian hospital. 94 This was followed by posts from February intimating he was a recognized leader of a new militia group, Saraya al-Aqidah (a.k.a. Saraya Ansar al-Aqidah), which had reportedly been deployed to Syria and had links to the Badr Organization. One of the group’s commanders, Muhammad Jaafar Shakr al-Musawi, had been a security official in Saghir’s court. 95
CALL TO JIHAD n 15 During his public funeral, Musawi’s coffin was draped in a Badr Organization flag. Musawi was named posthumously as a member of the Badr Organization Expeditionary Force, known as Quwet al-Shahid Muhammad Baqir Sadr. Following ISIS’s summer 2014 advance in Iraq, Saraya al-Aqidah adopted a far more publicly pro-Iranian stance by uploading imagery supportive of AAH, the Badr Organization, Kataib Hezbollah, and other Shiite proxy groups. 96 By October 2014, Saghir was photographed with Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani and in other photographs with groups of Badr Organization fighters. 97 Alongside the attempt to link Sistani with Saghir, statements released by Iranian proxies sought to intimate Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s support for the Syria campaign. In an undated statement released in December 2013, the Popular Committee for the Mobilization to Defend Sayyeda Zainab (Lijna al-Tabia al-Shabiyah an al-Sayyeda Zainab, or PCMDSZ), an umbrella recruitment group with links to AAH, KSS, the Badr Organization, Kataib Hezbollah, and other Iranian proxy groups, issued an extended argument as to why the fight in Syria was not only a legitimate campaign but also backed by high-ranking religious authorities: It is obvious that the goal of going to Syria is to defend the Shiites and the sect of Ahl al-Bait and Islamic shrines and the resistance because the takfiri groups in Syria have been targeting our sect and our shrines in a clear and direct way. We also confirm that our goal is not just restricted to Syria but also extends to our presence in Iraq, especially in Najaf. And we are going to defend and fight assailants who are coming to fight us, just like the prophet came out of Medina to face the mushrikin [idolaters] when he was informed that they were heading to Medina to destroy Islam. Thus, this is a defensive war and defensive wars do not require permission from anyone… Despite the issue not requiring anyone’s permission, [the jihad in Syria] has been overseen by a legitimate ruler who is the veli-e faqih [lead religious and political authority managing affairs on earth as an imam, in this case referring directly to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei]...Based on this, there is no doubt about the legitimacy of the figures who are abiding by the [leadership of absolute] velayat-e faqih. There is a dispute that some are bringing up, which is that some religious figures are saying: “I do not see any interest in going [to war].” Regarding these statements, they do not harm the legitimacy of those who go to fight under the emblem of obligatory interest [duty to go to war]...and this is something veli-e faqih supports and is convinced about. Not seeing the interest [in going] and labeling going as illegitimate activity are two different matters. The higher
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Page 3 and 4: POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD I
Page 5 and 6: C ONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 Introduct
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Page 9 and 10: 2 The Narrative of Jihad SINCE THE
Page 11 and 12: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 5 a useful
Page 13 and 14: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 7 An Open
Page 15 and 16: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 9 al-Amin,
Page 17 and 18: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 11 In a Fe
Page 19: 3 Call to Jihad: Clerical Views of
Page 23 and 24: CALL TO JIHAD n 17 direct Iranian m
Page 25 and 26: CALL TO JIHAD n 19 al-Sadr contradi
Page 27 and 28: 4 Building an Army for Zainab REPRE
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Page 31 and 32: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 25 re
Page 33 and 34: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 27 Re
Page 35 and 36: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 29 me
Page 37 and 38: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 31 tr
Page 39 and 40: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 33 PH
Page 41 and 42: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 35 Th
Page 43 and 44: 5 The Web of Multiplying Shiite Isl
Page 45 and 46: MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIA
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Page 57 and 58: JOINING OF FRONTS n 51 members. 262
Page 59 and 60: JOINING OF FRONTS n 53 Darraji’s
Page 61 and 62: 7 Policy Recommendations AS THE UNI
Page 63 and 64: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS n 57 such na
Page 65 and 66: NOTES AND SOURCES n 59 Revolutionar
Page 67 and 68: NOTES AND SOURCES n 61 33. Hassan H
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 65 79. Ibid. 80
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 67 110. “Sama
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 69 137. Mamuri
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 71 172. May 16,
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 73 205. Michael
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 75 233. Jacob Z
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 77 com/63568782
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NOTES AND SOURCES n 79 294. “Al-M
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS President Richar
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THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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