THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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46 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA reaches of Damascus near the vital M5 Damascus–Aleppo highway. Following combat in Barzeh, on December 13, 2013, the group moved into towns to the north, notably Adra, which also abuts the M5 highway. These operations coincided with Hezbollah and other Iraqi Shiite militia movements in the more rural and mountainous area to the north known as Qalamoun, where LAFA was also reportedly involved in the battles. LAFA’s operations commander, Ali Diab al-Rihal, was reportedly killed fighting in Yabroud, a town in Qalamoun where a major battle involved Iraqi Shiites and Hezbollah elements. 238 The Qalamoun campaign demonstrated the highly cooperative, if not interlinked, nature of the many Shiite militia organizations operating in Syria. In addition to Liwa Dhulfiqar’s movements, LAFA, AAH, and Afghan fighters were all reportedly present in the area along with Lebanese Hezbollah. Many of these deployments were announced from February to early March 2014. Zainab Reprise and Syria’s “Hezbollahzation” The “defense of Sayyeda Zainab” theme has been embraced by foreign and domestic Shiite fighters, including those with Lebanese Hezbollah. Indeed, for Syrian Twelver Shiites, who make up just 2 to 4 percent of the country’s population, Hezbollah is playing an outsize role when it comes to security, ideology, and the future at large. The group also wields remarkable influence over other Shiite groups operating within the country. And it has been aided militarily by Iran, which has helped rebuild, retrain, and at times construct from scratch elements that would later become Syria’s NDF, along with Syrian Alawite groups. The Hezbollah stance is especially pronounced when one looks at Nubl and Zahra, two Shiite towns surrounded by pro-rebel forces since 2012. In defending these towns, Hezbollah has not only showed its ability to reinforce security but has also altered the conflict narrative 239 from the Assad line emphasizing a secular “fight against terrorists” to an extension of the “defense of Sayyeda Zainab.” This Zainab narrative has been promoted regardless of local conditions and narratives, and was notable in the SSNP example provided earlier. This narrative shift was quite prominent in Busra al-Sham, a town best known for its Roman ruins and also home to a minority Shiite population. In 2009, Khalid Sindawi noted that the area “had an indigenous Shiite population for a century, but their Shiites have professed to be Sunnis.” 240 Neverthe-
MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIAS n 47 less, with pressures from the war and the presence of Hezbollah personnel, the area’s Shiites have increasingly adopted sectarian identities. Reportedly, Hezbollah even lost a commander named Abu Jaafar who was leading local forces. 241 Within Busra al-Sham, Hezbollah branding of local fighters has been enacted through Hezbollah-themed martyrdom posters, Hezbollah insignias on uniforms, and local embrace of the Sayyeda Zainab narrative. 242 Hezbollah-led cells have sprouted up all over Syria, led by Hezbollah commanders, populated by some Hezbollah fighters, and mainly staffed by Shiite and Alawite Syrians. One function of these groups has been to provide security backup for other Shiite entities. The Hezbollah-coordinated Jaish al-Imam al-Mahdi al-Muqawama al-Watani al-Aqaidiya fi Suriya (Army of Imam al-Mahdi, the National Ideological Resistance in Syria), for example, has not only incorporated Hezbollah symbols and a public loyalty to Hassan Nasrallah but also combined Khamenei, Khomeini, and Bashar and Hafiz al- Assad into a grand framework of Syrian and Iranian “resistance.” 243 According to pages associated with this new force, it has drawn members primarily from Tarsus, the hometown of one of its leaders, Sayyed Hashem Muhammad Ali, a Shiite. The group has been active in Aleppo. While Hezbollah actively aided in the creation of new Shiite sectarian entities, the group also helped build non-Shiite militias. In March 2014, images surfaced of two Armenian-American thugs turned pro-Assad militiamen wearing Hezbollah fatigues and posing with purported Hezbollah aides. 244 In August, Hezbollah encouraged Christians to form popular committees in Syria and Lebanon based on the “Islamic resistance” model. There was claimed to be a “high level of coordination between these committees… and Hezbollah’s military apparatus.” 245 Overall, the spread of so-called “resistance” model groups, even without an absolute loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader, represents a major strategic victory for Tehran and its proxies. Moreover, the experience and skill offered by Hezbollah fighters allows for the creation of new relationships in affected communities throughout Syria.
Page 1 and 2: THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS R
Page 3 and 4: POLICY FOCUS 138 THE SHIITE JIHAD I
Page 5 and 6: C ONTENTS Acronyms | iv 1 Introduct
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Page 9 and 10: 2 The Narrative of Jihad SINCE THE
Page 11 and 12: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 5 a useful
Page 13 and 14: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 7 An Open
Page 15 and 16: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 9 al-Amin,
Page 17 and 18: THE NARRATIVE OF JIHAD n 11 In a Fe
Page 19 and 20: 3 Call to Jihad: Clerical Views of
Page 21 and 22: CALL TO JIHAD n 15 During his publi
Page 23 and 24: CALL TO JIHAD n 17 direct Iranian m
Page 25 and 26: CALL TO JIHAD n 19 al-Sadr contradi
Page 27 and 28: 4 Building an Army for Zainab REPRE
Page 29 and 30: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 23 mi
Page 31 and 32: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 25 re
Page 33 and 34: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 27 Re
Page 35 and 36: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 29 me
Page 37 and 38: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 31 tr
Page 39 and 40: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 33 PH
Page 41 and 42: BUILDING AN ARMY FOR ZAINAB n 35 Th
Page 43 and 44: 5 The Web of Multiplying Shiite Isl
Page 45 and 46: MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIA
Page 51: MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIA
Page 55 and 56: JOINING OF FRONTS n 49 In Iraq, att
Page 57 and 58: JOINING OF FRONTS n 51 members. 262
Page 59 and 60: JOINING OF FRONTS n 53 Darraji’s
Page 61 and 62: 7 Policy Recommendations AS THE UNI
Page 63 and 64: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS n 57 such na
Page 65 and 66: NOTES AND SOURCES n 59 Revolutionar
Page 67 and 68: NOTES AND SOURCES n 61 33. Hassan H
Page 69 and 70: NOTES AND SOURCES n 63 June 15, 200
Page 71 and 72: NOTES AND SOURCES n 65 79. Ibid. 80
Page 73 and 74: NOTES AND SOURCES n 67 110. “Sama
Page 75 and 76: NOTES AND SOURCES n 69 137. Mamuri
Page 77 and 78: NOTES AND SOURCES n 71 172. May 16,
Page 79 and 80: NOTES AND SOURCES n 73 205. Michael
Page 81 and 82: NOTES AND SOURCES n 75 233. Jacob Z
Page 83 and 84: NOTES AND SOURCES n 77 com/63568782
Page 85 and 86: NOTES AND SOURCES n 79 294. “Al-M
Page 87 and 88: BOARD OF DIRECTORS President Richar

THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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