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THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

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24 n <strong>THE</strong> <strong>SHIITE</strong> <strong>JIHAD</strong> <strong>IN</strong> <strong>SYRIA</strong><br />

ing deniability required that the locations of their casualties go unreported<br />

or be kept deliberately vague. 146<br />

Newer Iraqi Shiite proxies like KSS and HHN not only announced their<br />

presence in Syria but also asserted themselves via large funeral demonstrations<br />

for members in May and June 2013. Indeed, funerals were a main means to<br />

announce a group’s involvement in Syria or to simultaneously announce its<br />

Syria activities and very existence. While reports surfaced that other Iranian<br />

proxy groups had sent fighters to Syria, some of these organizations remained<br />

mum on their involvement until summer 2013. The Badr Organization, following<br />

the deaths of two members in July 2013, admitted its involvement in<br />

Syria and its formation of a special force there.<br />

The second trend consisted of Sadrists, most likely those belonging to<br />

splinter groups. The Sadrists present in Syria were not necessarily direct followers<br />

of Muqtada and often encompassed a group broadly subscribing to<br />

the tenets espoused by his murdered father, Muhammad Sadiq. Sadrists, who<br />

were active in the war with the United States, have been linked to Iran and its<br />

proxies, both during that earlier war and since. Indeed, Sadrist recruits for the<br />

Syrian war were politically mobilized, highly sectarian, with training experience<br />

ranging from basic to more advanced.<br />

Viewed cynically, Iran and its proxies might have been seen to recruit<br />

Sadrists as both cannon fodder and to establish deniability for its efforts to<br />

bolster Assad. Considering Iran’s tensions with Muqtada al-Sadr, fighters<br />

sent to Iran for training and equipment and then led, in part, by the IRGC<br />

and other advisors might also fuel future Sadrist splits, thereby building<br />

influence for Iran.<br />

Whatever their idiosyncratic path, Sadrists have undoubtedly made a significant<br />

contribution to the Syrian Shiite jihad. The first trickle of foreign<br />

Shiite fighters to reach Syria emerged from this strain, and according to<br />

LAFA sources, the “first martyr to fall in Sayyeda Zainab ” was Jaafar Adhab<br />

Farhud, who was killed on May 12, 2012, and buried in Diwaniyah, Iraq. 147<br />

The placard above his tombstone, complete with images of Muqtada al-Sadr<br />

and his father, Muhammad Sadiq, says he was a “casualty of cowardly terrorists<br />

in Syria.” 148<br />

According to an October 2012 report, members of al-Sadr’s senior leadership<br />

were deploying to Syria under the guise of pilgrimages to Sayyeda<br />

Zainab. One such individual affirmed, “When we went to Najaf, they told<br />

us it’s a call for fighting in Syria against the Salafis.” 149 It was around the<br />

same time that direct Iranian involvement in the war, through proxy forces,

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