THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

50 n THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA
Seeking to represent Basra, Harishawi underlined his main motivation for running
as being the result of a taklif sharii, as outlined in a flyer and online materials.
257 During the campaign, Harishawi trumpeted his service in Syria and the
necessity of a “sacred defense” against takfiris. 258 In television appearances and
printed materials, he showcased his wartime experience and injuries, including
his loss of an eye “in front of Sayyeda Zainab.” 259 Even his late campaign manager,
Ali Falah al-Maliki (a.k.a. Abu Mujahid), was a Syrian war veteran. 260 Yet
Maliki was a relatively shadowy figure. Appearing in few online photos since
2013, his position within KSS was never officially confirmed nor discussed until
after Harishawi’s announcement that he would run for office. Nevertheless,
the relationship between the two in Syria was treated prominently. Thus, Harishawi’s
candidacy and campaign doubled as a venue from which to legitimize
the jihad in Syria and the broader Iranian moves to push their Islamic resistance
narratives and groups.
Only after Maliki’s death in Iraq on August 12, 2014, was the extent of his
historical involvement in Iranian proxy operations released on his official Facebook
“martyrdom” page. In one post, it was asserted that he had also fought in
the marsh campaigns against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and “resisted [U.S.
and coalition] occupation forces” when they were in Iraq. 261
While stories of Maliki and his peers reflect the multiple purposes served
by Shiite Syrian jihadists, they also reflect a larger strategy for Iranian proxy
groups: to project their interests into various electorates and legitimize their
involvement in Syria. Iran’s proxies will, moreover, continue to view politics as a
means of advancing their larger war for regional domination.
Iraq: Shiite Militias “Split,” Grow, and Fight
The Iranian quest to achieve regional dominance through its proxies is further
demonstrated by the experience of fighters returning to Iraq from Syria. Since
former Iraqi prime minister Maliki’s December 2013 offensive in Anbar, these
returnees have seen action on a number of fronts. Related organizations have
thus expanded from having bases in Syria alone—although staffed by Iraqis—
to having bases in both Syria and Iraq. Many of these “defenders of Shiism,”
as the narrative goes, announced their support for Maliki’s Anbar offensive;
such groups included AAH, KSS, and Liwa Dhulfiqar.
The story of Muhammad al-Biyadh, who returned to Iraq after serving
as a field commander in Aleppo for Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’s LAIY,
further demonstrates the multiple, shifting affiliations held by Iran’s proxy