THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS

MULTIPLYING SHIITE ISLAMIST MILITIAS n 45
well as the Shiite militia Liwa al-Hamad, in the Aleppo area, a trend that
has continued throughout 2014, as detailed in the spreadsheet “Shiite Militia
Geography.” (See appendix 7.) In April 2014, the group engaged in heavy
fighting against rebel forces near the Aleppo Artillery School. The Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights called the area’s clashes “the fiercest since the
fighting began in Aleppo.” 235 The Badr Organization has also been located
operating around Aleppo.
By fall 2013, offensives in areas surrounding the Sayyeda Zainab shrine
depended on using Shiite militias to counter rebel advances and later launch
offensives against the rebels. From October 13 to November 5, groups such as
the RRF, Liwa Dhulfiqar, Saraya Talia al-Khurasani, and others all engaged
in fighting in Husseiniyah, a few miles south of the shrine. (See appendix 7.)
Al-Sbeneh, an urban area to the west of the shrine, was subjected to
numerous rounds of conflict. Liwa Dhulfiqar claimed to be operating in the
area on October 5, and in the first week of November, when posts about the
fighting were most frequent, mentions also included KSS. Into 2014, fighting
included engagements reported by the Badr Organization in February and
other Shiite militias on March 10, 2014. (See appendix 7.)
From late 2013 through August 2014, heavy fighting overtook East
Ghouta, which encompasses routes connecting Damascus and Damascus
International Airport. Areas affected included Beit Sahem, Babbila, Jaramana,
and particularly al-Mleha. In Beit Sahem, the RRF, LAFA, LIH, and
the Badr Organization all saw action. At the start of 2014, Lebanese Hezbollah
was reportedly engaged in Babbila. From January to April 2014, KSS, the
RRF, and HHN’s Liwa al-Imam al-Hassan al-Mujtaba were located in Jaramana.
(See appendix 7.) Al-Mleha was an area of almost continuous conflict
and saw reports of the broadest cross-section of Shiite fighters, including all
the main LAFA subgroupings: LAAG, LIH, Liwa Dhulfiqar, and the RRF.
These groups continued reporting their activities in al-Mleha until June–July
2014. 236 Primarily in April–May 2014, Iran’s more open proxies also fought
in the area, particularly the Badr Organization, KSS, AAH, Afghan Shiite
fighters, and Hezbollah. Only in mid-August 2014 did pro-Assad forces, with
“help from [Hezbollah],” finally take the restive town of al-Mleha. 237
Starting in September, Liwa Dhulfiqar was placed in the middle of a
number of larger-scale operations, deployed with larger Shiite militias in
both offensive and defensive operations. By November 2013, Liwa Dhulfiqar
announced operations in the northern section of Damascus known as Barzeh.
These battles appeared to have the strategic goal of securing the northern