Thinking, Fast and Slow - Daniel Kahneman

always weighted more: Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, “Heuristic and Analytic Processes in
Reasoning,” British Journal of Psychology 75 (1984): 451–68.
the opposite effect: Norbert Schwarz et al., “Base Rates, Representativeness, and the Logic of
Conversation: The Contextual Relevance of ‘Irrelevant’ Information,” Social Cognition 9
(1991): 67–84.
told to frown: Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre, “Overcoming Intuition.”
Bayes’s rule: The simplest form of Bayes’s rule is in odds form, posterior odds = prior odds ×
likelihood ratio, where the posterior odds are the odds (the ratio of probabilities) for two
competing hypotheses. Consider a problem of diagnosis. Your friend has tested positive for a
serious disease. The disease is rare: only 1 in 600 of the cases sent in for testing actually has
the disease. The test is fairly accurate. Its likelihood ratio is 25:1, which means that the
probability that a person who has the disease will test positive is 25 times higher than the
probability of a false positive. Testing positive is frightening news, but the odds that your
friend has the disease have risen only from 1/600 to 25/600, and the probability is 4%.
For the hypothesis that Tom W is a computer scientist, the prior odds that correspond to a
base rate of 3% are (.03/. 97 = .031). Assuming a likelihood ratio of 4 (the description is 4
times as likely if Tom W is a computer scientist than if he is not), the posterior odds are 4 × .
031 = 12.4. From these odds you can { odes as l compute that the posterior probability of Tom
W being a computer scientist is now 11% (because 12.4/112. 4 = .11).
15: Linda: Less is More
the role of heuristics: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Extensional Versus Intuitive
Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment,” Psychological Review
90(1983), 293-315.
“a little homunculus”: Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus (New York: Norton, 1991).
weakened or explained: See, among others, Ralph Hertwig and Gerd Gigerenzer, “The
‘Conjunction Fallacy’ Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors,”
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12 (1999): 275–305; Ralph Hertwig, Bjoern Benz, and
Stefan Krauss, “The Conjunction Fallacy and the Many Meanings of And,” Cognition 108
(2008): 740–53.
settle our differences: Barbara Mellers, Ralph Hertwig, and Daniel Kahneman, “Do Frequency
Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration,”
Psychological Science 12 (2001): 269–75.
16: Causes Trump Statistics