Thinking, Fast and Slow - Daniel Kahneman

Samuel R. Gross and Kent D. Syverud, “Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial,” Michigan Law Review 90 (1991): 319–93.
the frivolous claim: Chris Guthrie, “Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory,”
University of Chicago Law Review 67 (2000): 163–216.
30: Rare Events
wish to avoid it: George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee, and Ned Welch,
“Risk as Feelings,” Psychological Bulletin 127 (2001): 267–86.
vividness in decision making: Ibid. Cass R. Sunstein, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst
Cases, and Law,” Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 61–107. See notes to chapter 13: Damasio,
Descartes’ Error. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, “The {r, n>: C. A Affect
Heuristic.”
Amos’s student: Craig R. Fox, “Strength of Evidence, Judged Probability, and Choice Under
Uncertainty,” Cognitive Psychology 38 (1999): 167–89.
focal event and its: Judgments of the probabilities of an event and its complement do not
always add up to 100%. When people are asked about a topic they know very little about
(“What is your probability that the temperature in Bangkok will exceed 100° tomorrow at
noon?”), the judged probabilities of the event and its complement add up to less than 100%.
receiving a dozen roses: In cumulative prospect theory, decision weights for gains and losses
are not assumed to be equal, as they were in the original version of prospect theory that I
describe.
superficial processing: The question about the two urns was invented by Dale T. Miller,
William Turnbull, and Cathy McFarland, “When a Coincidence Is Suspicious: The Role of
Mental Simulation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989): 581–89.
Seymour Epstein and his colleagues argued for an interpretation of it in terms of two systems:
Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Seymour Epstein, “Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and Subjective
Probability: Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 63 (1992): 534–44.
judged it as more dangerous: Kimihiko Yamagishi, “When a 12.86% Mortality Is More
Dangerous Than 24.14%: Implications for Risk Communication,” Applied Cognitive
Psychology 11 (1997): 495–506.
forensic psychologists: Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, “Violence Risk Assessment and
Risk Communication.”
“1 of 1,000 capital cases”: Jonathan J. Koehler, “When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match
Statistics?” Law and Human Behavior 25 (2001): 493–513.