SIGAR

SECURITY
SIGAR will report additional ANDSF
assessment details in a classified annex to
this report.
Although the ANDSF’s strategic communications operations are strong at
the national level, DOD reported challenges remain in provincial and local
level operations because they do not effectively synchronize and coordinate
messages. The MOD and MOI are mitigating this through national-level
deployable media centers that travel where needed to manage messaging. 203
Last quarter, USFOR-A reported the ANDSF lacked a risk-management
system and relied heavily on U.S. forces to prevent strategic failure. This
quarter USFOR-A explained that risk-management personnel are identifying
the risks to the mission and to the force in both current and future operations,
as well as identifying mitigating measures. Coalition advisors are
instructing ANDSF mission planners to identify and mitigate risks. 204
ANDSF Strength
As of November 26, 2016, ANDSF assigned force strength was 315,962 (not
including civilians), according to USFOR-A. 205 As reflected in Table 3.8, the
ANA is at 86.3% and the ANP at 94% of authorized strength, not including
civilian employees. 206 The November 2016 assigned-strength number reflects
a decrease of 1,295 personnel over the same period last year. 207
Compared to last quarter, the ANP had a decrease of 845 personnel,
the first time it has decreased in strength in a year. The ANA (including
Afghan Air Force and civilians) decreased by 1,108 personnel, as shown
in Table 3.9. 208 However, when ANA civilians are excluded, the decrease in
ANA military strength was 902 personnel. 209
According to DOD, attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than
for the ANP, in part because ANA soldiers enlist for limited lengths of duty
and have more widespread deployments across the country, while police
view their careers as longer-term endeavors. 210 The ANA does not allow
soldiers to serve in their home areas to decrease the potential for local
influence. DOD observed that the policy results in increased transportation
costs and obstacles for soldiers attempting to take leave, contributing to
some soldiers going absent without leave. However, the ANP historically
suffers significantly more casualties than the ANA. 211
According to DOD, the Coalition is no longer encouraging pay incentives
or salary to address retention, as they have not been shown to be effective. 212
SIGAR has an ongoing Special Project on the Afghan military students who
go missing while attending U.S.-funded training in the United States.
ANDSF Causalities
From January 1, 2016, through November 12, 2016, according to figures
provided by the Afghan government to USFOR-A, 6,785 ANDSF service
members were killed and an additional 11,777 members were wounded. 213
DOD reported the majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result
of direct-fire attacks, with IED explosions and mine strikes accounting for
much lower levels of casualties. 214
98
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION