SIGAR

AFGHAN PROCUREMENT REFORM
identify and develop requirements.” 40 The DOD IG also observed, however,
that Afghan provincial leaders without authority to obligate government
funds were entering into informal agreements with contractors for goods
and services, and that CSTC-A was inconsistently applying penalties for
ministry failures to meet commitments.
The DOD IG said allowing provincial leaders to enter into unofficial procurement
arrangements invites corruption and favoritism. Further, “Until
CSTC-A is able to help [the Afghan government] address its contracting
deficiencies,” the DOD IG warned, “future U.S. direct assistance funding
continues to be vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse.” 41 In general,
the DOD IG reported, “CSTC-A officials believe the NPC involvement has
enforced contracting standards and decreased corruption in the contracting
process.” However, “CSTC-A has not identified any metrics to determine the
NPC’s effectiveness.” 42 CSTC-A had, however, earlier commented that the
new NPC process produced the Afghan fiscal year “1394 procurement crisis”
that left many MOD contracts incompletely executed or not awarded by
the end of the fiscal year. 43
Delays in the reformed procurement process may in part reflect leadership’s
and procurement officers’ backgrounds, generally in policy rather
than practice, according to former NPA official Noori: “They have little
experience with the procurement process. . . . During my time at NPA, I
heard many complaints from the infrastructure sector that approval of contracts
or even small contract extension or alterations would take months at
NPA and NPC to be approved.” 44
Integrity Watch Afghanistan likewise saw “some progress” in President
Ghani’s transparency commitments, the creation of the NPA and NPC, and
reshuffling of justice-sector staff, but “in terms of having a clear and comprehensive
strategy and the institutionalized approach to fight corruption,
as well as in terms of the prosecution of corruption cases, the [National
Unity Government] has not been particularly successful.” 45 That is a concern
for procurement reform, because visibly effective anticorruption
measures help keep vendors and procurement officials honest, or at least
deterred from dishonesty.
Afghanistan is, of course, not alone in struggling to improve public procurement.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), of which Afghanistan is
a member, has a technical-assistance project under way to improve procurement
in several developing member countries; the initial focus was on
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam. 46 The ADB notes that developing
countries’ reform efforts “have primarily focused on first-generation
reforms at the national level,” such as changes in legal and regulatory
frameworks, but adds, “a huge task remains to translate these into actual
changes in procurement practices and outcomes.” The aim of ADB’s technical
assistance is to strengthen the capacity of ministries, local governments,
and other procuring entities. 47
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2017
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