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<strong>SIGAR</strong> OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES<br />

• Afghan Security Forces Capacity and Capabilities<br />

Afghanistan needs a stable security environment to prevent it from<br />

again becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other terrorists. More<br />

than half of all U.S. reconstruction dollars since 2002 have gone toward<br />

building, equipping, training, and sustaining the Afghan National<br />

Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). However, the ANDSF has not<br />

yet been capable of securing all of Afghanistan and has lost territory<br />

to the insurgency. As of August 28, 2016, USFOR-A reported that<br />

only 63.4% of the country’s districts were under Afghan government<br />

control or influence a reduction from the 72% as of November 27, 2015.<br />

Capability gaps in key areas such as intelligence, aviation, and logistics<br />

are improving, but still hinder effectiveness.<br />

• Corruption<br />

Corruption continues to be one of the most serious threats to the U.S.-<br />

funded Afghanistan reconstruction effort. Corruption has eroded state<br />

legitimacy, weakening the government’s ability to enlist popular support<br />

against the insurgency, discouraging foreign investment and economic<br />

growth, as well as seriously diminishing Afghan military capability.<br />

• Sustainability<br />

Much of the funding the United States has committed to reconstruction<br />

projects and programs risks being wasted because the Afghans<br />

cannot sustain the investment—financially or functionally—without<br />

massive, continued donor support. Donors were expected to finance<br />

approximately 69% of Afghanistan’s $6.5 billion fiscal year (FY) 1395<br />

national budget (December 22, 2015–December 21, 2016), mostly<br />

through grants. At 2016 conferences in Warsaw and Brussels, the United<br />

States and other donors pledged to maintain assistance to Afghanistan<br />

at or near current levels through 2020.<br />

• On-budget Support<br />

On-budget assistance includes direct assistance (also referred to as<br />

bilateral, government-to-government assistance) and assistance that<br />

travels through multi-donor trust funds before reaching the Afghan<br />

government. On-budget assistance is intended to reduce costs, increase<br />

Afghan government ownership, and build the Afghan institutional<br />

capacity for managing their own budget. However, on-budget assistance,<br />

whether delivered directly or through multilateral trust funds, leads to<br />

reduced U.S. control and visibility over these funds. Given the evidence<br />

that the Afghan government still cannot manage and protect these funds<br />

and may not use them appropriately, the Department of Defense is<br />

planning to reduce some of its on-budget assistance.<br />

• Counternarcotics<br />

The cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs puts the entire U.S.<br />

investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan at risk. Although<br />

58<br />

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

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