01.02.2018 Views

atw 2018-02

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 2 ı February<br />

Investigation of Conditions Inside the<br />

Reactor Building Annulus of a PWR<br />

Plant of KONVOI Type in Case of Severe<br />

Accidents with Increased Containment<br />

Leakages<br />

Ivan Bakalov and Martin Sonnenkalb<br />

1 Introduction and analysis method The severe accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP resulted in<br />

severe core damage and significant releases of hydrogen and radioactive materials from primary containment boundary<br />

into or through the reactor buildings of three out of the six reactors (units 1 to 3). Based on analyses of the accident<br />

progression it was realized that accidentally increased leaks from the inertized containment contributed to the<br />

radionuclide and hydrogen release into the reactor building, thus leading to hydrogen explosions, severely damaging<br />

the reactor building constructions.<br />

The Fukushima Daiichi accident triggered<br />

worldwide stress tests and<br />

re-assessments of the NPP plant<br />

safety. In Germany the process<br />

resulted in an improvement and<br />

extension of the existing severe accident<br />

management (SAM) concept<br />

by both additional preventive and<br />

mitigative measures. The main improvements<br />

in the mitigative domain<br />

is a new concept of severe accident<br />

management guidelines (SAMG) with<br />

strategies and procedures intended to<br />

be used by the plant crisis team for<br />

mitigation of the consequences of<br />

severe accidents. The SAMG concept<br />

follows relevant recommendations<br />

of the German Reactor Safety Commission<br />

RSK [1].<br />

Analyses of the hydrogen as well<br />

as aerosol and noble gas behaviour<br />

in case of increased containment<br />

leakages into the reactor building<br />

annulus of a German PWR KONVOI<br />

reference plant under severe accident<br />

conditions have been performed using<br />

the GRS lumped parameter code<br />

COCOSYS. The investigation carriedout<br />

focusses on the assessment of the<br />

efficiency of newly developed SAM<br />

measures as described in the new<br />

SAMG handbook or some measures<br />

proposed in addition for a PWR<br />

reference plant of KONVOI type. The<br />

assessed strategies are related to the<br />

mitigation of challenging conditions<br />

inside the reactor building (RB)<br />

annulus due to design based and<br />

increased containment leakages<br />

during severe accidents.<br />

The analyses are based on previous<br />

GRS investigations of the hydrogen<br />

mitigation concept with passive autocatalytic<br />

recombiners (PAR) inside<br />

the PWR KONVOI containment [2] as<br />

well as the reassessment of the effectiveness<br />

of the filtered containment<br />

venting concept of PWR KONVOI [3].<br />

The main findings contribute to<br />

further improvement of the planned<br />

mitigative SAM measures in case of<br />

enhanced containment leakages into<br />

the reactor building annulus under<br />

severe accident conditions.<br />

1.1 COCOSYS plant model<br />

The COCOSYS nodalisation scheme<br />

of the PWR KONVOI plant with focus<br />

on the RB annulus is presented in<br />

Figure 1. The nodalisation of the<br />

containment and the RB annulus is<br />

developed in such a way that thermal<br />

and gas stratification processes<br />

expected under accident conditions,<br />

local and global convection flows<br />

between the compartments, and longterm<br />

convection processes inside<br />

the containment could be simulated<br />

appropriately. Therefore, a refined<br />

subdivision of the containment compartments<br />

and RB annulus rooms and<br />

free space was chosen. The model<br />

considers all relevant gaseous and<br />

liquid flows through different compartment<br />

connections such as free<br />

openings, fire protection doors, burst<br />

membranes, drainages, etc. For the<br />

purpose of heat and mass transfer<br />

modelling inside the containment<br />

and the RB annulus heat structures<br />

representing the walls, floors, ceilings<br />

and metal internals are introduced<br />

into the model. With all these features<br />

the model adequately represents all<br />

relevant design specific features of the<br />

PWR KONVOI reference plant – both<br />

inside the containment as well as the<br />

RB annulus.<br />

The containment has a total free<br />

volume of 70,000 m 3 . It is subdivided<br />

into four areas which can have<br />

different convection flow regimes<br />

depending on the initial event of a<br />

sequence and the break/discharge<br />

location. The first area represents the<br />

containment compartments, in which<br />

the reactor pressure vessel and the<br />

steam generators are located. The<br />

| | Fig. 1.<br />

COCOSYS nodalisation scheme of the RB annulus and location of containment penetrations through the containment steel shell.<br />

85<br />

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY<br />

Environment and Safety<br />

Investigation of Conditions Inside the Reactor Building Annulus of a PWR Plant of KONVOI Type in Case of Severe Accidents with Increased Containment Leakages ı Ivan Bakalov and Martin Sonnenkalb

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!