COMBAT AND COMPETITION.pdf - Lakes Gliding Club

CHAPTER EIGHT IN A QUANDARY
1943. A light bomber group - two composite groups comprising some
thirty Spitfire and Typhoon squadrons, hived off from a reorganising
Fighter Command - seven Mustang equipped fighter recce squadrons
from Army Cooperation Command and the same number of Auster Air
OP Squadrons. It was a start, but there was less than six months to go
and, in that limited time, the composite groups had to be expanded by
a further twenty squadrons.
A natural lead into the next part of the syllabus. Operational
training. The sheer delight at being let loose on a modern single seat
fighter. Authorised low flying. Satisfaction at bringing back a good set
of reconnaissance photographs. Success at air gunnery. Sorties led by
an instructor who really put you through the hoops - battle formation,
endless crossover turns, tailchasing and mock combat - so that you
were forced to fly your aircraft to the limit. And you landed back,
wringing in sweat, with a marvellous feeling of satisfaction, like the
end of a hard fought rugger match.....
Those memories helped to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of
operational training. Aerial photography, and standard attacks on
enemy bombers, were effectively taught because the techniques were well
defined and backed up by proper illustrated detail. Most important and
valuable of all was what, much later, came to be known as lead/follow
training, under the control of experienced, highly motivated, instructors.
The main shortcoming was in ground attack. This seemed to stem
from the fact that the OTUs - unlike the elementary and service flying
training schools which operated to established methods and standards
- were always chasing a changing requirement.
Ground attack was a major change, and trained pilots were needed
quickly in the run up to the invasion. It was all too much for a system
geared to the output of 'straight fighter boys.
The day was saved by such notable efforts as those of Batchy
Atcherley, at CFE, and the Low Attack Instructors School, set up at
Millfield, by Denys Gillam. Even so, in the opinion of many pilots,
ground attack and the techniques of army close support never got the
attention which they deserved.
All the evidence suggested a failure to set up and sustain a
minimum OTU capability - to support it with a sound and developing
syllabus - and to stop it being eroded by short term squadron needs.
Continuity, however limited, even when pilots or aircraft were in short
supply, would have been far better than closing units down. Operational
skills and tactics were what mattered and took time to assimilate. Type
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