COMBAT AND COMPETITION.pdf - Lakes Gliding Club

COMBAT AND COMPETITION
'pathfinder' marking of difficult targets, with smoke rockets or napalm.
There was also the question of switching the Cab Rank effort
quickly to vital sectors along the front. The American tank formations,
on their breakout from Normandy, solved the problem with direct radio
communication between the leading tanks and the supporting 9th
Tactical Air Force fighter bombers. And to avoid problems of mistaken
identity they carried red canvas roof panels.
One of the constraints on close support was Tedder's 'curse of the
heavy bomber'. When, as happened very occasionally, the heavies
bombed short and hit our own troops the bomb line was pushed
forward in a panic response. Sometimes thousands of yards. It was
frustrating to be barred from attacking the enemy by an edict which
bore no relationship to the accuracy of fighter ground attack.
Whenever the battle went mobile, and the ground forces started to
advance, we were faced with a similar band of enemy territory in
which no air attacks were permitted. And the faster their progress the
broader it was. Thus, when the Hun was at his most vulnerable, forced
onto the roads in daylight, the bomb line afforded him its greatest
protection. It was another powerful argument in favour of direct radio
communication with the forward troops.
Mobile warfare raised other problems. A rapid advance increased
the flying distance to the battle area, until drop tanks became essential,
creating a conflict between range and hitting power The RP equipped
Typhoons were reduced from carrying eight rockets (twelve maximum
on two tier installations) to four plus two 45 gallon drop tanks. For the
fighter bombers it was a question of tanks or bombs. Typhoons had been
known to operate with a single 500lb bomb under one wing, and a drop
tank under the other, but it was very rare.
Mobile warfare also meant more armed reconnaissance. Broadly the
alternatives were to go in on the deck trying to avoid any known
defended areas (not so easy in a fluid situation), or just above the light
flak ceiling of 4000 feet. At this level formations of eight aircraft
tended to be the norm. Low down it was better to operate sections of
four, or even pairs, particularly if the weather was bad.
To pull up immediately on encountering a train or road convoy,
unless you could hit it on your first pass, was simply asking to be
clobbered. Much better to press on out of range and come back in a dive,
line abreast, at right angles to the length of the target. These tactics
enabled the whole formation to attack simultaneously - faster in and
out - with a better chance of swamping the defences. Fewer flak guns
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