COMBAT AND COMPETITION.pdf - Lakes Gliding Club

COMBAT AND COMPETITION
conversion was not a problem. But an inability to recognise the extent,
and the penalties, of 'on the job' operational training certainly was.
It was said that there were plenty of fighter leaders from the
Middle East who were experienced in army support. But they were
hardly evident in the Typhoon squadrons of 84 Group and the terrain,
in any case, was very different to that of the Western Desert. Moreover
the German armies, which had become exceedingly skilled at
camouflage in the face of allied air superiority, exploited those
differences to good effect.
At CFE the Air Fighting Development Unit, which included ground
attack, provided valuable training for fighter leaders. But this did
nothing directly to develop the operational skills of the chaps they went
on to lead - except by example on ops. 'Training on the job' in another
guise.
Armament Practice Camps were a limited form of post operational
training. The squadrons rotated through them in turn, coming off ops
for two weeks at a time, for intensive RP and bombing practice. The
results of each sortie were easy to measure, and the trends were
generally positive, so APCs were considered to be a good thing. But
just how good? For this was a highly subjective judgement,
unsupported by any meaningful analysis in squadron terms.
Comparing the limited overall figures available from 193's visit to
Fairwood Common in September 1944, with the improvement in
individual pilot performances, is illuminating. These suggest that the
average squadron dive bombing error had reduced from well over 100
yards to less than 30 yards - and the low level error from around 50
yards to less than 25 yards. A considerable increase in hitting power
- which was apparent from the results when we went back on ops.
There was another facet to the operational training story. By 1942,
it had been established that single seat fighters were capable of
handling army support and reconnaissance, which had been the
preserve of light bombers and other specialist aircraft like the
Lysander. Not only that but they sustained lower losses, were easier for
other fighters to escort, and could look after themselves much better
in combat.
From that moment it could be argued that there was a growing
requirement for a new breed of fighter pilot. One who, with respect
to his forebears, could navigate himself really accurately, find pinpoint
locations and seek out an enemy on the ground.
Whether to reconnoitre, to photograph, or to attack was immaterial
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