VGB POWERTECH 7 (2021) - International Journal for Generation and Storage of Electricity and Heat

Digital transformation of the coal sector VGB PowerTech 7 l 2021
Present
Electricity, produced by a
central power plant, flows
one way to customers
Sub stations convert
high voltage to
lower voltage
Future
Electricity, produced by a
central power plant, wind
turbines and solar panels,
flows to customers
Electricity is stored
in utility batteries
Industrial
customer
Industrial cutomers both
consume and produce electricity
lndustral customers commumcate usage
information back to the power provider
Electricity is stored in utility batteries
Residential and
business customers
commumcate usage
mformation back to
the power provider
Smart appliances, electric
cars and street lights are
some of the devices that
will communicate to the
power provider
Business
customer
Residential
customer
Residential and business customers both
consume and produce electricity using
solar panels and wind turbines
Electricity is stored
in batteries
Fig. 2. Transformation of a conventional grid to a smart grid (Umbach, 2018).
tools to identify or predict any issues and
determines the appropriate actions with
real-time responses to prevent or resolve
the problems, and to maximise the potential
performance and profitability of assets,
power plants and fleets to achieve the best
possible outcomes. By using software that
understands a machine’s physical capabilities
relative to its theoretical potential, today’s
advanced analytics and control can
detect any deviations from setpoints and
adjust operating parameters in real time to
optimise operational and environmental
performance and minimise production
costs. Digital Twins provide a platform to
simulate and visualise individual equipment,
processes and an entire plant’s operation,
and to keep track of performance,
operation and maintenance (O&M) needs.
The Cloud provides power producers with
computing service ver the internet with
faster innovation, flexible resources and
economies of scale. Data are the main driver
in the digitalisation of power plants. AI
and machine learning, combined with Big
data, enables power plants to shift from
current preventive maintenance systems to
predictive or condition-based maintenance.
Digital tools can detect any anomalies
or operational issues, assess the likelihood
of asset failures, identify their respective
root causes and when they might
occur, and recommend quick actions for
their resolution. Consequently, forced outages
are minimised, uptime is increased,
and the lifetime of assets and power plants
are extended leading to reduced O&M
costs and improved economic value of the
plants. Big data and advanced analytics and
AI can provide power producers with insights
on the state and performance of assets,
processes and operations within a
plant and system-wide, help them to make
better, faster decisions and to maximise
the plant’s operational efficiency while responding
optimally to changing conditions
on the grid and in the overall power
market.
Using data from remote sensors, power
producers can pinpoint where to send a
crew for a repair, and based on an assessment
of the damage, ensure the team arrives
with the right tools for the job and
receive the support they need. Robotics
can be used to perform inspections, maintenance
and repair activities at risky or
difficult-to-reach areas or sites, improving
health and safety standards, reducing repair
time and O&M costs.
As digitalisation advances, power plant operation
becomes increasingly dependent
on ICT, which increases the risk of cyber
attacks (F i g u r e 2 ). Hardware and software
have been developed and implemented
to protect energy infrastructure from
such attacks. Digital solutions adopting AI
and machine learning, and/or blockchains
for enhanced cyber security are under development.
• Stuxnet
• Night Dragon
http://www.langer.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf
• Dragonfly
• Malvertising
• Pawn-Storm
• Disakil
• WannaCry
• Petya
• BadRabbit
• Triton
• Meltdown
• Spectre
• Botnets
• Coinminers
2010 2012 2014
2016
2018?
• Shamoon/Disttrack
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/me dia/security_response/wh itepa pers/targeted_attacks_against_the_energy_sector.pdf
http://docplayer.org/501374-Cyber-risiken-und-sicherheitsansaetze-fuer-die-energiebranche.html
http://resources.crowdstrike.com/putterpanda/
http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/topic.jsp?id=malicious_code_trends&a id=triage_analysis_oftargeted attacks
http://www.syma ntec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf
https://securelist.com/files/2014/07/EB-YetiJuly2014-Public.pdf
https://secu relist.com/files/2014/07 /Kaspersky_Lab_crouching_yeti_appendixex_eng_final.pdf
https://securelist.com/files/2014/08/KL_Epic_Turla_TechnicaI_Appendix_20140806.pdf
http://threate.s3-website-us-east -1_amazonaws.com/?/arachnophobia
http://trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-pawn-storm.pdf
http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/eve-2014-4114/
http://www.sophos.com/en-us/media library/PDFs/technieal%20papers/sophos-rotten-tomato-campaign.pdf
http://www.invincea.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Micro-Targeted-Malvertising-WP-10-2 7-14-1.pdf
http://www.novetta.com/files/9714/1446/8199/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf
https://www.tigersecurity.pro/operation-distributed-dragons/papers/ARODD_ EN20141020. pdf
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kong-pro-democracy-movement.htm
http://cylance.cam/operation-cleaver
https://secureiist.com/files/2015/02/The-Desert-FaIcons-targeted-attacks.pdf
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/us-had-cyberattack-planned-if-iran-nuclear-negotiations-failed.html?_r=O
http://twitter.com/olesovhcorn/status/778019962036314112
http://thehakernews.com/2016/11/heating-system-hacked.html
https://www.engadget.com/2016/11/29/mirai-botnet-tergets-deutsche-telekom-routers-in-globa1-cyberatt/
https://motherboard.vice.com/enus/article/internet-of-things-teddy-bear-leaked-2-million-parent-and-kids-message-recordings
https://www.symatec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-22-2017-en.pdf
https://blog.radware.com/security/2017/04/hajime-futureproof-botnet/
https://www.symatec.com/connect/blogs/hajime-worm-battles-mirai-control-internet-things
https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-attack/
https://www.thelocal.at/20170128/hotel-ransomed-by-hackers-as-guests-locked-in-rooms
https://motherboard.vice.eo m/en_us/article/how-this-internet-of-things-teddy-bear-ean-be-remotely-turned-into-a-spy-device
https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/ShareDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/14012017cayla.html
https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/04/brickerbot-the-permanent-denia1-of-service-botnet-is-back-with-a-vengeance/
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-0IA
Fig. 3. Power grid infrastructure related to cyber attacks (Meisel and others, 2018).
• Ransomware, infecting
Software-Supply-Chain
(ab)using loT
58