Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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symbolic gesture which the Bureau of East-Asian and Pacific Affairs was uneasy about. Abrams recalls that the East Asian bureau actually “did not want to let [Kim] in the building.” 55 The East Asian bureau regarded Kim as a “‘troublemaker’ and a ‘flake,’” Lister wrote in 1999. 56 But, according to Abrams, “Lister quietly persisted on Kim’s behalf” and after several months Abrams met with Kim. 57 The meeting “went off very well,” Lister recalled. 58 Kim accepted a fellowship at Harvard University in 1983 and 1984. Meanwhile, Lister and Kim established closer contact. Lister was personally invited to dinner with Kim and his family on September 10, 1984. 59 Kim was already preparing his return to South Korea, but over dinner Kim asked Lister if it would be possible for Lister to arrange a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, then the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the East Asian bureau. 60 The meeting happened. Kim phoned Lister on October 14, 1984 to say that he had recently met for one hour with Wolfowitz. 61 On November 2, 1984, Kim wrote to Lister asking him to accept a scroll of Kim’s calligraphy as a gift. The calligraphy, Kim wrote, “is an expression of my friendship toward you and my appreciation for your support for the Korean people and myself.” 62 Before Kim Dae Jung returned to South Korea in early 1985, Lister would help Kim one more time. He arranged for Kim to give a speech at the Open Forum, which was a speaker series at the State Department established in 1967 to encourage open dissent and debate. 63 Several days before the speech, Kim requested Lister’s 109
opinion of the text. Lister suggested several changes which made the text less confrontational but probably more likely to garner support from State Department officials for Korean democracy. 64 Kim accepted Lister’s changes, and he gave the speech to a standing room crowd on January 23, 1985. The speech was a “great success” and was met by “much applause” Lister reported to Abrams that day. 65 After the speech, Kim lunched at the eighth floor restaurant with various officials, mainly from the East Asian and human rights bureaus. 66 Soon after the speech Kim returned to South Korea and was placed under house arrest. His return, however, helped intensify the pro-democracy movement. 67 At the human rights bureau, Lister became “inundated” with visits from Korean democratic groups. 68 U.S. policy towards the South Korean regime finally started to change. Ambassador David Walker, who had refused to meet with the democratic opposition, was replaced in 1986. 69 In February 1987, Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur, Wolfowitz’s successor at the East Asian bureau gave a speech in which he called on the Korean government to democratize or face losing U.S. support. 70 Sigur’s comments were followed by more U.S. pressure. 71 In June 1987, Chun agreed to relinquish the South Korean presidency and allow direct elections. 72 Kim Dae Jung ran in those elections and lost, but democracy in South Korea had been largely restored. James Fowler has written that U.S. public pressure was one of the keys to Chun’s decision to permit elections in 1987. 73 Attempting to explain U.S. policy, 110
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Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Chile..............................
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contributions to U.S. foreign polic
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etween personalities and more as a
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duties but not jeopardize his caree
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21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
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younger sister. As Lister’s long-
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as an ideological battle that the U
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February 1955, Lister received a le
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wanted to bring the entire Socialis
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Schlesinger soon began working toge
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espects Saragat more than vice-vers
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Socialist Party that this office ha
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First, his contacts with Italian So
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eceptive to the Italian Socialists
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64 George Lister, “Political Less
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As he frequently did though, Lister
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Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
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leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
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Latin Americans to watch out for [t
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Lister’s facility with explaining
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away from the Communists, much as h
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Domingo as part of an inter-departm
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the crisis was “interesting and i
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War effort. Besides his propaganda
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Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
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win the ideological battle against
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31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
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104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
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ights suddenly became a major U.S.
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Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
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Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
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Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
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Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
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Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
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Page 115: of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
Page 119 and 120: Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121 and 122: that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 123 and 124: concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
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Page 127 and 128: luncheons with the Chilean Congress
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Page 131 and 132: 62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134: 129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136: movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138: Lister’s other political base was
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Page 141 and 142: open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144: Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146: Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148: Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150: Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
Page 151 and 152: U.S. State Department. Career Histo
Page 153 and 154: Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156: Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158: Memorial Service for George Lister.
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