Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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noticed by widely distributing it to Members of Congress. 149 Shlaudeman recalls that in the Ford administration, “Lister was always Xeroxing things.” 150 Part of what Shlaudeman may have observed was Lister performing this sort of activity—helping activists to spread information about human rights. Some of the time, though, Lister was dismayed that activists were not providing objective information. In 1981, Uruguayan human rights activist Juan Ferreira, son of the exiled Uraguayan politician Wilson Ferreira, was asked to testify before Congress about the human rights situation in his home country, which had been under military rule since 1973. 151 Lister told Ferreira the night before the hearing that he “hoped he would be objective and accurate…and that he would include improvements, as well as shortcomings, in Uruguay in his testimony.” 152 Ferreira replied that he intended to discuss some improvements, and provided Lister with a copy of his opening statement, which was apparently not completely to Lister’s liking. 153 Lister attributed Ferreira’s bias mainly to a sense of patriotism. “Uruguay is closest to his heart and it is more difficult for him to be objective on that subject,” Lister wrote. 154 However, the most common kind of bias that Lister encountered among human rights activists was left-wing bias. U.S. human rights activists in particular had a tendency to criticize the human rights practices of right-wing dictatorships but not those of Communist countries, such as Cuba. Lister urged them to be objective, or face losing credibility. “He reminded everyone that if you’re against torture by right- 89
wing regimes, you had to be against torture by left-wing regimes,” said Frank Calzon, executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba, upon Lister’s death. 155 “He insisted that the human rights community could not be selective in its concerns.” 156 La Voy said Lister reminded her to be “ethically consistent.” “[H]e was very concerned that if I speak about human rights in Guatemala for example, or in any place where the United States was, in my view, on the wrong side…that I be very very clear and equally eloquent about Poland or about Cuba,” remembered La Voy. 157 The issue of objectivity was, of course, the same one that Lister dealt with within the State Department, only the bias was usually of opposite kind—an emphasis on the human rights abuses of Communist dictatorships but not on those of right-wing regimes. Lister thus found himself wedged between two communities, which displayed opposing biases, and he strove to be an arbiter of what constituted objectivity. Encouraging Human Rights Careers and Ambitions A second way Lister made a significant impact on the U.S. human rights movement was by encouraging people to pursue human rights careers. Eubank recalls that Lister was always trying to recruit people—including her—to the human rights cause. 158 Some took his advice. Lister met Juan Ferreira in 1974, when Ferreira was visiting the U.S. with his exiled father. 159 Lister urged Ferreira to stay in Washington, D.C. to try to improve U.S. human rights policy. 160 Ferreira was persuaded to work in 90
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Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Chile..............................
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contributions to U.S. foreign polic
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etween personalities and more as a
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duties but not jeopardize his caree
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21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
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younger sister. As Lister’s long-
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as an ideological battle that the U
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February 1955, Lister received a le
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wanted to bring the entire Socialis
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Schlesinger soon began working toge
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espects Saragat more than vice-vers
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Socialist Party that this office ha
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First, his contacts with Italian So
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eceptive to the Italian Socialists
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64 George Lister, “Political Less
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As he frequently did though, Lister
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Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
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leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
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Latin Americans to watch out for [t
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Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49 and 50: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 51 and 52: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
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Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
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Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
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Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84: ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86: moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88: democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92: occurred. Lister’s own toughness
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Page 101 and 102: he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
Page 103 and 104: 49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
Page 105 and 106: 117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
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Page 117 and 118: opinion of the text. Lister suggest
Page 119 and 120: Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121 and 122: that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 123 and 124: concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
Page 125 and 126: violations by the Pinochet governme
Page 127 and 128: luncheons with the Chilean Congress
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Page 131 and 132: 62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134: 129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136: movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138: Lister’s other political base was
Page 139 and 140: State Department as well as human r
Page 141 and 142: open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144: Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146: Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
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Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
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Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
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U.S. State Department. Career Histo
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Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
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Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
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Memorial Service for George Lister.
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