Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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statement still had not been inserted. 111 Lister went to Harkin’s office, spoke with Harkin, and discovered that a staffer had decided against inserting the statement at the request of Joseph Eldridge and another human rights activist. 112 However, Lister spoke with Harkin and persuaded him to stick to the original plan, arguing that Pinochet could best be weakened by the perception that the U.S. government did not support him. 113 Harkin placed the statement into the record on July 29, and the statement had an unexpectedly positive effect. 114 On August 5, 1983, 70 Members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State George P. Schultz expressing approval of the press briefing statement. 115 Lister then took news of this success to the NGOs. At a meeting between the bureau and various NGOs on September 26, 1983, Lister distributed the letter and other related documentation. 116 By the time Abrams was replaced by Richard Schifter in October 1985, Pinochet still showed few signs that he was prepared to release his hold on power. When popular discontent mounted in 1983, Pinochet had begun transition talks with the opposition, but then backtracked, declaring a “state of siege” and launching a crackdown on political activity. 117 Pinochet had also rejected the National Accord, the joint agreement reached by the opposition parties in August 1985. 118 However, in March 1986, the U.S. sponsored a United Nations Human Rights Commission resolution that criticized Pinochet for human rights abuses and called for a return to democracy. 119 For the previous six years, the Reagan administration had abstained from or voted against United Nations resolutions that condemned human rights 117
violations by the Pinochet government. 120 The resolution marked a major reversal of previous U.S. policy favoring quiet diplomacy. Schifter admitted as much. ''We go public when our quiet entreaties are not responded to,'' Schifter told the press at a news conference in Geneva after the resolution had been proposed. 121 The decision to pursue the resolution reflected both U.S. discontent with Chilean progress on human rights issues as well as Schifter’s preference for working in international human rights bodies. 122 Lister was probably not the impetus behind the resolution, but he helped its passage by securing support for it by the Chilean opposition. In February 1986, before the U.S. proposed the resolution, Lister consulted with opposition leader Martin Poblete, who provided comments on the draft. 123 In March, Schifter brought the resolution to the Geneva headquarters of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, while Lister remained behind to work with the Chilean opposition residing in the United States. Most diplomats in Geneva assumed that Chilean democrats would be against the U.S. resolution. 124 But Lister, because he had good relationships with the Chilean opposition, was able to secure the opposition’s support; he also urged them to send their own representative to Geneva, which they did. 125 Schifter announced after returning to the U.S. that Lister had played a “key role” in obtaining support for the resolution, Lister recalled in 1993. 126 On March 15, 1986, with the resolution passed, Eugenio Velasco came to the human rights bureau to pick up the final draft. 127 Velasco told Lister that passage of the resolution was one of the two most significant events for the democratic 118
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Chile..............................
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contributions to U.S. foreign polic
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etween personalities and more as a
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duties but not jeopardize his caree
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21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
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younger sister. As Lister’s long-
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as an ideological battle that the U
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February 1955, Lister received a le
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wanted to bring the entire Socialis
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Schlesinger soon began working toge
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espects Saragat more than vice-vers
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Socialist Party that this office ha
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First, his contacts with Italian So
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eceptive to the Italian Socialists
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64 George Lister, “Political Less
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As he frequently did though, Lister
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Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
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leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
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Latin Americans to watch out for [t
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Lister’s facility with explaining
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away from the Communists, much as h
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Domingo as part of an inter-departm
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the crisis was “interesting and i
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War effort. Besides his propaganda
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Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
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win the ideological battle against
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31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
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104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
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ights suddenly became a major U.S.
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international human rights experts
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Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
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Reagan’s human rights policy was,
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When, as a result of the hearings,
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Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
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Page 117 and 118: opinion of the text. Lister suggest
Page 119 and 120: Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121 and 122: that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 123: concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
Page 127 and 128: luncheons with the Chilean Congress
Page 129 and 130: how Lister managed to have such a l
Page 131 and 132: 62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134: 129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136: movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138: Lister’s other political base was
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Page 141 and 142: open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144: Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146: Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148: Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150: Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
Page 151 and 152: U.S. State Department. Career Histo
Page 153 and 154: Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156: Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158: Memorial Service for George Lister.
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Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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