Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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Polish Ambassador, who may lose his enthusiasm when he sees how things are working out…” 31 Rome: 1957 - 1961 Background Between 1957 and 1961, Lister served as the First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Rome. Lister’s Italian experience proved to be defining for him. In Rome, Lister adopted a strategy of combating Communism by trying to break the historic alliance between Socialists and Communists. Lister hoped to persuade Italian Socialists to leave their Communist political partners and join in a center-left coalition government. Rome also provided Lister with his first run-in with the State Department bureaucracy—an experience from which he did not emerge unscathed. Democracy in Italy was in a precarious position in the late 1950s. Italy had the largest Communist Party of any democratic country in the world, with the Communist Party receiving nearly 25 percent of the vote. 32 The Italian Christian Democratic Party (the “Christian Democrats”) held power, but there was no alternative party which believed in a democratic system. 33 The Italian Socialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni, generally allied itself with the Communists. In 1956, the Soviet invasion of Hungary had convinced a group of “autonomists” within the Socialist Party to favor splitting with the Communists and allying themselves with the Christian Democrats. 34 They were reluctant to do so, however, due to the political risks, and because they 15
wanted to bring the entire Socialist party with them, not just a faction. A decade before, Guiseppe Saragat and a group of followers had left the Socialist party to form the Democratic Socialist Party (“Social Democrats”), but Saragat’s party had become weak. 35 The Eisenhower policy in the 1950s, under Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, had been to take a hard line against the Socialists and to not have direct contact with them. 36 Luce’s successor, Ambassador James D. Zellerbach, continued the policy after Luce left her post in 1957. 37 When Lister arrived in Rome in September 1957, 38 he was given responsibility for reporting to the Embassy on the activities of several leftist Italian political parties, including the Social Democrats, the Republicans (another left of center party), the Socialists, and the Communists. 39 With Zellerbach’s approval, Lister established contact with Socialist autonomists in early 1958 and soon was having regular conversations with them. 40 Lister’s efforts to influence the Italian Socialists continued with the support of the Embassy until early 1959, 41 when Outerbridge Horsey became the new Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). 42 Horsey was skeptical about the possibilities for bringing the Socialists into the democratic fold, and, according to Lister, he expressed that the “the thing to do was to drive the Socialists back towards the Communists.” 43 Horsey put pressure on Lister to cease meeting with the Socialists, but Lister continued the meetings. He also reached an agreement with the Italian desk at the State Department by which he was permitted to send informal reports back to Washington giving his 16
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Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 25 and 26: Schlesinger soon began working toge
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29 and 30: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 31 and 32: First, his contacts with Italian So
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39 and 40: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 41 and 42: leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49 and 50: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 51 and 52: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
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Human rights were rhetorically usef
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substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
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a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
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encourage improvement. As if to und
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Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
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ut the hearings were the starting p
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moment. The bureau had already been
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democratic opposition leaders. List
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greater attention to human rights v
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occurred. Lister’s own toughness
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ability to update the State Departm
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a wide open society, essentially de
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wing regimes, you had to be against
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convinced that clear, reliable info
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he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
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49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
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117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
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Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
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The Carter administration had campa
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the Sandinista government became in
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the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
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of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
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opinion of the text. Lister suggest
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Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
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that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
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concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
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violations by the Pinochet governme
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luncheons with the Chilean Congress
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how Lister managed to have such a l
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62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
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129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
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movement—in particular, by insist
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Lister’s other political base was
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State Department as well as human r
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open a political conversation with
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Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
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Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
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Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
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Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
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U.S. State Department. Career Histo
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Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
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Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
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Memorial Service for George Lister.
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