Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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of Communist infiltration was weak to begin with; and because of the unlikelihood that Lister, a stranger to the Dominican Republic, could quickly enter into those Communist circles that did exist. 84 “I just remember our general feeling that the whole exercise was ludicrous,” he recalled. 85 By finding evidence of Communist infiltration of the rebel movement, Lister’s reports did tend to justify Johnson’s policy. On the other hand, Lister’s reports were not necessarily beholden to the Johnson administration’s preferred version of events. His analyses may have reduced Communist involvement in the rebel movement beyond what the administration wished to believe. Lister also reported that there was “some feeling in Santo Domingo that we should have pushed harder in past months for holding elections, and that this might have helped to avoid the recent explosion.” 86 Some of what Lister reported evidently was controversial. His performance evaluation commends him for “his intellectual courage in reporting events and situations honestly and objectively (regardless of the effect this might have on his career).” 87 Military Solutions to the Communist Problem Though Lister specialized in strategies to win the ideological battle against the Communists, he could be hawkish in his foreign policy approach. As his involvement in the Dominican episode indicates, Lister was not averse to the use of U.S. military power. Furthermore, at least in the late 1960s, he worked hard to support the Vietnam 45
War effort. Besides his propaganda suggestions for undercutting the anti-war movement, Lister was dedicated to a project to win financial or military support for the war from the governments of Latin American countries, according to Sandy M. Pringle, who served in the Bureau Inter-American Affairs in the late 1960s. 88 Pringle recalls Lister’s efforts were generally unsuccessful. 89 Lister’s views on Vietnam may have evolved. In a note from late 1967, Averell Harriman asked Lister to prepare a memorandum calling into question Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s anti-Vietnam stance given the Senator’s earlier support for counter-insurgency operations as Attorney General. 90 During the Kennedy administration, Harriman had chaired a special “CI” committee on counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam. 91 Harriman wrote that he chose Lister for the memorandum because he wanted it to come from “someone who has admired the work [Robert Kennedy] did for the Special Group C.I.” 92 Lister replied to Harriman that he preferred not to write the memorandum due to the risks to his career. 93 But Lister also suggests uneasiness with promoting counterinsurgency tactics, telling Harriman “I still remain faithful to your original exhortation to me (at the time of my assignment to ARA) to work on behalf of ‘peaceful, democratic revolutions’ in America” (emphasis added). 94 Additionally, Lister was beginning to question whether U.S. assistance to Latin American countries was being used for repressive purposes. In September 1970, he went on a tour of the International Police Academy, a school providing training to 46
Page 1 and 2: Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
Page 3 and 4: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 5 and 6: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21 and 22: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 23 and 24: wanted to bring the entire Socialis
Page 25 and 26: Schlesinger soon began working toge
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29 and 30: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 31 and 32: First, his contacts with Italian So
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39 and 40: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 41 and 42: leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49 and 50: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 51: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
Page 73 and 74: Human rights were rhetorically usef
Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
Page 77 and 78: a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84: ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86: moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88: democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92: occurred. Lister’s own toughness
Page 93 and 94: ability to update the State Departm
Page 95 and 96: a wide open society, essentially de
Page 97 and 98: wing regimes, you had to be against
Page 99 and 100: convinced that clear, reliable info
Page 101 and 102: he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
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49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
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117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
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Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
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The Carter administration had campa
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the Sandinista government became in
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the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
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of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
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opinion of the text. Lister suggest
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Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
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that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
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concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
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violations by the Pinochet governme
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luncheons with the Chilean Congress
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how Lister managed to have such a l
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62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
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129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
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movement—in particular, by insist
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Lister’s other political base was
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State Department as well as human r
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open a political conversation with
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Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
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Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
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Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
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Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
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U.S. State Department. Career Histo
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Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
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Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
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Memorial Service for George Lister.
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