Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

More documents

Recommendations

Info

power, but that the U.S. should actually support it. 86 Schlesinger and Komer may have reached these conclusions on their own, but perhaps they had also read Lister’s reports from the field. Regardless, it appears that Lister helped to win Schlesinger and Komer a new ally in the administration in the form of Averell Harriman. Harriman’s visit to Italy in March 1961, when he requested Lister’s opinion on Italian politics, convinced the senior diplomat to support Schlesinger and Korman. Schlesinger wrote that by June 1961, when Prime Minister Fanfani visited Washington, the Kennedy administration had made up its mind to support the apertura. According to Schlesinger, Kennedy told Fanfani that if he “thought the center-left a good idea, we would watch developments with sympathy.” 87 Schlesinger recalled that the difficulty was in convincing a staunchly conservative State Department to implement the policy. 88 Another account by Leopoldo Nuti casts Kennedy as undecided as to how much to advocate for a center-left government, but still willing to give Schlesinger free reign to operate. 89 Perhaps the visits by Italian Socialists to the White House that Lister arranged eventually helped persuade Kennedy to reach out to Nenni. Lister later said that it was Schlesinger who “played the leading role in changing Washington policy regarding the Italian center-left.” 90 Impact on the Emergence of the Center-Left Even if Schlesinger was the key to persuading Kennedy, George Lister still made a significant contribution to the emergence of a center-left government in Italy. 23
First, his contacts with Italian Socialists helped moderate both their views towards the U.S. and perhaps their ideological commitments, making an alliance with the Christian Democrats more conceivable. Second, Lister helped bring about what was perhaps a watershed moment—Kennedy’s long conversation with Nenni at the Rome garden party in June 1963. The conversation was a “highly symbolic” moment according to Nuti. 91 Lister helped this moment to occur in two ways. By influencing the Socialist stance toward the U.S., he made it possible for Nenni to publicly embrace Kennedy. And to some extent, his efforts may have helped a group of top officials led by Schlesinger to persuade Kennedy to act. Schlesinger later gave Lister “much credit for the development and consolidation of the center-left, and the isolation and eventual collapse of the Italian Communist Party.” 92 At first blush, it might seem dubious that Lister could have such a profound effect on Italian politics. Yet, Italian politics at the time were sensitive to the international climate such that, according to Nuti, the “gradual softening of the American position was bound to draw attention, spur discussion, and have a remarkable political impact...” 93 Nuti argues that the Kennedy administration affected the timing and nature of the formation of a center-left government in Italy, though Nenni was moving toward forming a center-left government at some point anyway. 94 24
Page 1 and 2: Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
Page 3 and 4: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 5 and 6: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21 and 22: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 23 and 24: wanted to bring the entire Socialis
Page 25 and 26: Schlesinger soon began working toge
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39 and 40: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 41 and 42: leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49 and 50: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 51 and 52: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
Page 73 and 74: Human rights were rhetorically usef
Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
Page 77 and 78: a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82:
Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84:
ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86:
moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88:
democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90:
greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92:
occurred. Lister’s own toughness
Page 93 and 94:
ability to update the State Departm
Page 95 and 96:
a wide open society, essentially de
Page 97 and 98:
wing regimes, you had to be against
Page 99 and 100:
convinced that clear, reliable info
Page 101 and 102:
he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
Page 103 and 104:
49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
Page 105 and 106:
117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
Page 107 and 108:
Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
Page 109 and 110:
The Carter administration had campa
Page 111 and 112:
the Sandinista government became in
Page 113 and 114:
the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
Page 115 and 116:
of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
Page 117 and 118:
opinion of the text. Lister suggest
Page 119 and 120:
Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121 and 122:
that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 123 and 124:
concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
Page 125 and 126:
violations by the Pinochet governme
Page 127 and 128:
luncheons with the Chilean Congress
Page 129 and 130:
how Lister managed to have such a l
Page 131 and 132:
62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134:
129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136:
movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138:
Lister’s other political base was
Page 139 and 140:
State Department as well as human r
Page 141 and 142:
open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144:
Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146:
Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148:
Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150:
Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
Page 151 and 152:
U.S. State Department. Career Histo
Page 153 and 154:
Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156:
Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158:
Memorial Service for George Lister.
show all

Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?