Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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present U.S. policies and objectives in a favorable manner. Cables sent by Lister to U.S. embassies in Latin America urged them to stay informed about the U.S.-Soviet relationship so as to accurately explain the conflict to Latin Americans; to follow propaganda from Communist governments more closely in order to find ways to use it against them in Latin America; and to improve contact with Latin American people, not just with Latin American governments, including with politicians out of power, intellectuals, and activists critical of U.S. policy. 14 Lister persistently called upon embassies to take a politically astute approach to fighting Communism and to have the kind of contact with Latin Americans which would both positively influence Latin American political views and gather information for U.S. policymakers. At some level, Lister was advocating applying the same kinds of strategies he had used in Eastern Europe and as a political officer in Rome. Some of Lister’s directions to embassies were probably heeded, but evidently many embassies, to Lister’s dissatisfaction, remained blissfully unaware of local political trends. When guerrilla violence broke out in Bolivia in 1966, Lister lamented the failure of the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia to have predicted the potential for such activity. 15 In response, Lister advocated a new policy requiring embassies to report on potential guerrilla activities; he was successful in winning approval for the policy, which he cabled all ARA embassies on June 5, 1967 to announce. 16 The two greatest deficiencies in U.S. policy towards Latin America were a “lack of effective political dialogue with the left” and a “lack of attention to potential 33
leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 17 Regarding the latter problem, attention to potential leaders, Lister attempted to create an institutionalized framework. In 1969, Lister wrote a lengthy draft report titled “Identifying, Contacting and Influencing Potential Latin American Leaders.” 18 The report analyzed the activities of the entire U.S. government—including the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Labor Department, and the Defense Department—in building relationships with potential leaders in Latin America, particularly with Latin American youth and young professionals. 19 The report called for more attention to the issue, better coordination of programs and objectives, and regular evaluation of relevant programs. 20 A draft of Lister’s report was proposed to the National Security Council as National Security Study Memorandum NSSM 68. The draft, however, was unsuccessful at winning National Security Council approval. 21 Opposition was perhaps greatest from the Defense Department, which, according to Lister, “paid lip service to the draft ‘as a useful exercise’” but opposed the concept of seeking to influence potential Latin American leaders as unfeasible. 22 U.S. Visa Policy Lister had more success at changing U.S. government policy in another arena: U.S. visa policy. Lister believed that only rarely should the U.S. fail to grant a visa due to a foreigner’s political beliefs, even if those beliefs were representative of the 34
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Page 3 and 4: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 5 and 6: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21 and 22: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 23 and 24: wanted to bring the entire Socialis
Page 25 and 26: Schlesinger soon began working toge
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29 and 30: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 31 and 32: First, his contacts with Italian So
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49 and 50: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 51 and 52: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
Page 73 and 74: Human rights were rhetorically usef
Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
Page 77 and 78: a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84: ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86: moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88: democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92:
occurred. Lister’s own toughness
Page 93 and 94:
ability to update the State Departm
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a wide open society, essentially de
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wing regimes, you had to be against
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convinced that clear, reliable info
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he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
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49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
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117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
Page 107 and 108:
Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
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The Carter administration had campa
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the Sandinista government became in
Page 113 and 114:
the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
Page 115 and 116:
of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
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opinion of the text. Lister suggest
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Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
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that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
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concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
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violations by the Pinochet governme
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luncheons with the Chilean Congress
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how Lister managed to have such a l
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62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
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129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
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movement—in particular, by insist
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Lister’s other political base was
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State Department as well as human r
Page 141 and 142:
open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144:
Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146:
Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148:
Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150:
Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
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U.S. State Department. Career Histo
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Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156:
Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158:
Memorial Service for George Lister.
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