Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

More documents

Recommendations

Info

various Dominicans seeking asylum aboard the U.S.S. Boxer warship; 71 and various Dominicans on the streets and in the bars of Santo Domingo. 72 Lister’s analysis of the Dominican situation was that the majority of rebels were not Communists and that Communists had not been involved in planning the uprising. 73 At the same time, he believed that Communists in the Dominican Republic had taken advantage of the situation and that the rebels had lost control of the uprising. 74 “Commies apparently knew trouble was coming and were ready to go for jugular when saw opportunity,” Lister cabled to Washington on May 9. 75 His final report, written after his return, concluded that Communists would not initially have controlled the government if the rebels had won, but that they likely would have “maneuvered themselves into complete control” within six months. 76 Lister concluded overall that the intervention had been necessary. 77 Lister was an unusual choice for the mission because he had had little experience in Dominican affairs, recalled Harry Shlaudeman, who served as a political counselor at the U.S. embassy in the Dominican Republic from 1962-1964. 78 Given his lack of familiarity with the Dominican Republic and the short notice he was given for the trip, Lister executed his assigned task well. An evaluation of Lister’s performance in the Dominican crisis praises him for his series of “highly useful cables” which displayed “enterprise and ability in making valuable contacts easily and obtaining badly needed information quickly…” 79 Lister’s final 10-page report on 43
the crisis was “interesting and informative enough” that it was sent to the White House. 80 Beyond his personal performance, Lister’s impact during the Dominican crisis needs to be understood in the context of the intervention. At the time, many Latin Americans were outraged that the U.S. had interfered militarily in a sovereign state’s affairs. 81 Historians have doubted U.S. motives as well. Eric Chester Arthur, for example, has argued that President Johnson’s official reason for intervening in the Dominican Republic was pretextual. The U.S. intervened, according to Chester, not because Communists had usurped the rebel movement, but because President Johnson and his top aides were uncomfortable with a return to power of left-leaning Juan Bosch, the constitutionally elected president. 82 The U.S. intervention led to an election in 1966 between Bosch and Joaquín Balaguer, the former deputy to Trujillo. Balaguer won amidst accusations of voter fraud, allowing him to rule autocratically until 1978 and be a force in Dominican politics for most of the next 30 years. 83 Lister’s task during the Dominican crisis thus was to provide a post-hoc justification for a policy that critics said was not necessarily wise or based on sound evidence. Lister undoubtedly must have felt pressure to produce only the kind of intelligence that would justify the President’s policy—much as some intelligence analysts felt in the lead-up to the current Iraq war. Shlaudeman recalled that he found Lister’s mission to be “bizarre” for several reasons: because the Johnson administration had already gone through with the intervention; because the evidence 44
Page 1 and 2: Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
Page 3 and 4: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 5 and 6: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21 and 22: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 23 and 24: wanted to bring the entire Socialis
Page 25 and 26: Schlesinger soon began working toge
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29 and 30: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 31 and 32: First, his contacts with Italian So
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39 and 40: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 41 and 42: leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
Page 73 and 74: Human rights were rhetorically usef
Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
Page 77 and 78: a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84: ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86: moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88: democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92: occurred. Lister’s own toughness
Page 93 and 94: ability to update the State Departm
Page 95 and 96: a wide open society, essentially de
Page 97 and 98: wing regimes, you had to be against
Page 99 and 100: convinced that clear, reliable info
Page 101 and 102:
he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
Page 103 and 104:
49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
Page 105 and 106:
117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
Page 107 and 108:
Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
Page 109 and 110:
The Carter administration had campa
Page 111 and 112:
the Sandinista government became in
Page 113 and 114:
the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
Page 115 and 116:
of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
Page 117 and 118:
opinion of the text. Lister suggest
Page 119 and 120:
Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121 and 122:
that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 123 and 124:
concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
Page 125 and 126:
violations by the Pinochet governme
Page 127 and 128:
luncheons with the Chilean Congress
Page 129 and 130:
how Lister managed to have such a l
Page 131 and 132:
62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134:
129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136:
movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138:
Lister’s other political base was
Page 139 and 140:
State Department as well as human r
Page 141 and 142:
open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144:
Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146:
Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148:
Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150:
Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
Page 151 and 152:
U.S. State Department. Career Histo
Page 153 and 154:
Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156:
Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158:
Memorial Service for George Lister.
show all

Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?