Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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own, unofficial descriptions of the Italian left. 44 On July 1, 1960, 45 while Horsey was on vacation in Austria, Lister took his case to Ambassador Zellerbach; 46 as a result, the Embassy made some slight modifications in its official policy stance. 47 However, tension between Lister and his Embassy superiors led the Political Counselor, his immediate boss, to criticize him in a February 1961 efficiency report for “a lack of discipline and cooperativeness.” 48 In March, 1961, Roving Ambassador W. Averell Harriman visited Rome. Lister served as Harriman’s interpreter in conversations with leaders of the Socialist and Republican parties. 49 Aware that Lister was knowledgeable about Italian politics, Harriman invited Lister to his hotel to discuss the Italian political situation. 50 Harriman evidently agreed with Lister’s attempts to reach out to the Socialists; according to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Harriman “pronounced Lister the only officer in the Rome Embassy who understood the Communist problem.” 51 Later that year, Lister’s tour in Rome ended. He returned to Washington, D.C., where he was informed by the State Department’s Promotion Panel that he had been recommended for “selection out” of the Foreign Service. 52 Lister’s job was only saved by intervention from Harriman, although he was still demoted—a consequence which severely hampered Lister’s career prospects. 53 Lister, however, continued to be involved in the Italian political situation. On October 16, 1961, Harriman wrote to Lister to tell him that he had mentioned Lister’s name to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., then a top advisor to Kennedy. 54 Lister and 17
Schlesinger soon began working together. Lister’s Italian center-left friends often would come to Washington, D.C. on visits, and Lister would take them to the White House to be introduced to Schlesinger. 55 The turning point in Italy finally happened in July 1963, when Kennedy, on a visit to Rome, took Nenni aside at a garden party for a lengthy conversation. 56 In November 1963, the Socialists joined with the Christian Democrats and entered the government, forming the first center-left coalition in Italian history. 57 Lister believed that the formation of a center-left government had been a large success for U.S. interests. “The Nenni Socialists proved very cooperative in foreign affairs, Italy remained a staunch ally of the U.S., and the largest communist party in the world had sustained a sharp defeat,” he wrote around 1970. 58 Yet, the success was not unqualified. Nenni, the Deputy Prime Minister in the new government, accepted that Italy would remain part of NATO, a stance which bolstered U.S. security. 59 However, this caused a new split in the Socialist Party; 60 many Socialists continued to work with the Communists. 61 The Socialist party was so weak by the end of the 1960s that the Communist party managed to increase significantly its influence over the country’s political agenda. 62 The Socialists did not rebound until the 1980s. 63 18
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Page 3 and 4: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 5 and 6: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21 and 22: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 23: wanted to bring the entire Socialis
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29 and 30: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 31 and 32: First, his contacts with Italian So
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39 and 40: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 41 and 42: leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47 and 48: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 49 and 50: Domingo as part of an inter-departm
Page 51 and 52: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
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substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
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a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
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encourage improvement. As if to und
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Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
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ut the hearings were the starting p
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moment. The bureau had already been
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democratic opposition leaders. List
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greater attention to human rights v
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occurred. Lister’s own toughness
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ability to update the State Departm
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a wide open society, essentially de
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wing regimes, you had to be against
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convinced that clear, reliable info
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he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
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49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
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117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
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Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
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The Carter administration had campa
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the Sandinista government became in
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the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
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of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
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opinion of the text. Lister suggest
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Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
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that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
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concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
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violations by the Pinochet governme
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luncheons with the Chilean Congress
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how Lister managed to have such a l
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62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
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129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
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movement—in particular, by insist
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Lister’s other political base was
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State Department as well as human r
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open a political conversation with
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Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
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Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
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Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
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Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
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U.S. State Department. Career Histo
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Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
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Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
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Memorial Service for George Lister.
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