Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

More documents

Recommendations

Info

unheeded. In 1970, Socialist Salvador Allende was elected to the presidency. Lister wrote in a memo that the “deliberate decision” of the U.S. government not to develop contact with the Socialists during the 1960s had been a mistake. 57 Now a “triumphant Socialist-Communist” coalition had been elected “run by people who know little or nothing of us and of whom we are abysmally ignorant.” 58 Despite missed opportunities, Lister argued in 1970 that the U.S. should not give up attempts to influence the Allende government’s political philosophy or keep it from falling under Soviet influence. 59 It might be possible, he wrote, for the U.S. to establish a “modus vivendi” with Allende. 60 Once again, Lister’s input counted for little. On November 6, 1970, the National Security Council met to discuss ways to remove Allende from power. Over the next three years, the U.S. engaged in an effort “to destabilize the Chilean government—economically, politically, and militarily,” according to Chilean expert Peter Kornbluh. 61 On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, ousted Allende from power. Intervention in the Dominican Republic In a speech in 1992 on his role in the development of the Italian center-left, Lister asserted that he was not with the CIA in Italy and “never has been.” 62 Probably the closest Lister came to participation in a covert intelligence mission was in May 1965, when President Johnson intervened militarily in the Dominican Republic to prevent a popular rebellion from unseating a military junta. Lister was sent to Santo 41
Domingo as part of an inter-departmental team charged with gathering evidence that Communists had taken over the rebel movement. 63 The political situation in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was complicated. Prior to the 1960s, the country had suffered for three decades under the brutal rule of dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina. 64 In 1962, the country elected Juan Bosch, a moderate leftist, as president. A military coup deposed Bosch from power in September 1963. 65 In April 1965, an uprising began which attempted to restore Bosch to power. President Johnson, arguing that Communists had taken over the rebel movement and that a rebel victory would lead to a second Communist nation in the Caribbean, intervened to prevent the rebels’ success. In May 1965, the U.S. deployed a force of more than 31,000 from the Army, Navy, and Marines. 66 Upon only two hour’s notice, Lister was chosen as the State Department representative to go to Santo Domingo to produce evidence of Communist takeover of the rebel movement. 67 Arriving by Air Force plane on May 5, 1965, he was accompanied by a representative from the Department of Defense, an Army officer, and two representatives from the Department of Justice. 68 Over the course of several days, Lister interviewed Dominicans on both sides of the conflict, tape recording some of his interviews; 69 he then cabled synopses of his interviews to Washington. Among those he interviewed were the following: José Rafael Molina Urena, a rebel leader who had briefly been installed as president until a successful junta offensive; 70 42
Page 1 and 2: Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
Page 3 and 4: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 5 and 6: Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
Page 7 and 8: Chile..............................
Page 9 and 10: contributions to U.S. foreign polic
Page 11 and 12: etween personalities and more as a
Page 13 and 14: duties but not jeopardize his caree
Page 15 and 16: 21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
Page 17 and 18: younger sister. As Lister’s long-
Page 19 and 20: as an ideological battle that the U
Page 21 and 22: February 1955, Lister received a le
Page 23 and 24: wanted to bring the entire Socialis
Page 25 and 26: Schlesinger soon began working toge
Page 27 and 28: espects Saragat more than vice-vers
Page 29 and 30: Socialist Party that this office ha
Page 31 and 32: First, his contacts with Italian So
Page 33 and 34: eceptive to the Italian Socialists
Page 35 and 36: 64 George Lister, “Political Less
Page 37 and 38: As he frequently did though, Lister
Page 39 and 40: Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
Page 41 and 42: leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
Page 43 and 44: Latin Americans to watch out for [t
Page 45 and 46: Lister’s facility with explaining
Page 47: away from the Communists, much as h
Page 51 and 52: the crisis was “interesting and i
Page 53 and 54: War effort. Besides his propaganda
Page 55 and 56: Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
Page 57 and 58: win the ideological battle against
Page 59 and 60: 31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
Page 61 and 62: 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
Page 63 and 64: ights suddenly became a major U.S.
Page 65 and 66: international human rights experts
Page 67 and 68: Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
Page 69 and 70: Reagan’s human rights policy was,
Page 71 and 72: When, as a result of the hearings,
Page 73 and 74: Human rights were rhetorically usef
Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
Page 77 and 78: a reporter as “Mr. Human Rights.
Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84: ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86: moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88: democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92: occurred. Lister’s own toughness
Page 93 and 94: ability to update the State Departm
Page 95 and 96: a wide open society, essentially de
Page 97 and 98: wing regimes, you had to be against
Page 99 and 100:
convinced that clear, reliable info
Page 101 and 102:
he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
Page 103 and 104:
49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
Page 105 and 106:
117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
Page 107 and 108:
Chapter 5. Human Rights Case Studie
Page 109 and 110:
The Carter administration had campa
Page 111 and 112:
the Sandinista government became in
Page 113 and 114:
the Sandinistas, but he did not cha
Page 115 and 116:
of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
Page 117 and 118:
opinion of the text. Lister suggest
Page 119 and 120:
Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121 and 122:
that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 123 and 124:
concern about Chile, the Reagan adm
Page 125 and 126:
violations by the Pinochet governme
Page 127 and 128:
luncheons with the Chilean Congress
Page 129 and 130:
how Lister managed to have such a l
Page 131 and 132:
62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134:
129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136:
movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138:
Lister’s other political base was
Page 139 and 140:
State Department as well as human r
Page 141 and 142:
open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144:
Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146:
Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148:
Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150:
Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
Page 151 and 152:
U.S. State Department. Career Histo
Page 153 and 154:
Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156:
Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158:
Memorial Service for George Lister.
show all

Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?