Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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which continued to be divided over some of the ideological issues from the Allende era. 97 Socialists remembered that many political centrists had supported the 1973 coup and tolerated Pinochet’s repression. 98 There was also suspicion of Socialist aims; Chile, after all, was the only Latin American democracy in which Marxist leftists had won an election. 99 Within Socialist circles, some continued to prefer an alliance with the Chilean Communist Party rather than join in a united democratic opposition. 100 Lister worked hard to persuade the Socialists to cooperate with the democratic opposition and not to join with the Communists. In this regard, Lister finally was able to implement the approach he had urged upon the U.S. Embassy in Chile in the 1960s and early 1970s, when he tried to apply the lessons of his Italian experience. The first meeting between the two leading political parties from the Allende era— the Socialists and Christian Democrats—was made possible by the coordination of Abrams and Lister, according to Claudio Grossman. 101 Eleven opposition parties eventually joined together in August 1985 to call for a return to civilian rule, signing the National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy. 102 Although the democratic opposition would again fracture, it eventually united to oppose Pinochet in a 1988 plebiscite that led to Pinochet’s ouster. 103 At least at first, the dialogue probably affected the Chilean opposition more than it changed U.S. policy towards Chile. Abrams fought behind the scenes for a tougher policy against Pinochet, U.S. policy was equivocal. 104 Despite statements of 115
concern about Chile, the Reagan administration signaled support for the regime in other ways, such as by voting for loans to Chile by international financial institutions. 105 The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs would also sometimes make incorrect or contradictory statements. Lister reported to Abrams in September 1983 about a conversation in which ARA had insisted to a human rights activist that Chile was a democracy—to which Abrams’ tongue-in-cheek response was “ARA does more damage than the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]!” 106 There were also statements such as the one by ARA chief Langhorne Motley in February 1985, reported in The New York Times, that Chile’s future was “in good hands.” 107 The most definitive opposition to Pinochet was coming from Congress. 108 With so much ambiguity in U.S. policy, Lister did the next best thing to a policy change—which was to draw attention to instances of State Department support for democracy in Chile. At a press conference on July 11, 1983, a State Department official responded to a question about the Pinochet government’s arrest of former Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes. Within the response, the official observed that the U.S. supported the transition to democracy “sought by the vast majority of Chileans.” The statement received little attention in the U.S. press, but it was published verbatim in the Chilean press, and Lister reported that it was “well received” by Chilean opposition leaders. 109 To highlight and memorialize the statement, Lister asked Senator Tom Harkin to place it in the Congressional Record. 110 Harkin agreed, though by August 10 the 116
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Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Impacting Foreign Policy as a Mid-L
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Chile..............................
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contributions to U.S. foreign polic
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etween personalities and more as a
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duties but not jeopardize his caree
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21 Morton H. Halperin and Patricia
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younger sister. As Lister’s long-
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as an ideological battle that the U
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February 1955, Lister received a le
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wanted to bring the entire Socialis
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Schlesinger soon began working toge
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espects Saragat more than vice-vers
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Socialist Party that this office ha
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First, his contacts with Italian So
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eceptive to the Italian Socialists
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64 George Lister, “Political Less
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As he frequently did though, Lister
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Impact in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri
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leaders,” Lister wrote in 1971. 1
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Latin Americans to watch out for [t
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Lister’s facility with explaining
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away from the Communists, much as h
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Domingo as part of an inter-departm
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the crisis was “interesting and i
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War effort. Besides his propaganda
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Affairs to ask that the U.S. press
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win the ideological battle against
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31 Ibid. 32 Memo, George Lister to
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104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 C
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ights suddenly became a major U.S.
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international human rights experts
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Rights, Carter reiterated that U.S.
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Reagan’s human rights policy was,
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Page 75 and 76: substantial,” Shlaudeman said.
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Page 79 and 80: encourage improvement. As if to und
Page 81 and 82: Lister won plaudits from Patricia D
Page 83 and 84: ut the hearings were the starting p
Page 85 and 86: moment. The bureau had already been
Page 87 and 88: democratic opposition leaders. List
Page 89 and 90: greater attention to human rights v
Page 91 and 92: occurred. Lister’s own toughness
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Page 97 and 98: wing regimes, you had to be against
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Page 101 and 102: he had reduced mistrust, Lister hel
Page 103 and 104: 49 Telephone interview by Gregory K
Page 105 and 106: 117 Ibid., p. 13. 118 Report, Georg
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Page 115 and 116: of the 1980s. Lister’s relationsh
Page 117 and 118: opinion of the text. Lister suggest
Page 119 and 120: Lister wrote to Assistant Secretary
Page 121: that the USG is pro-Pinochet, you a
Page 125 and 126: violations by the Pinochet governme
Page 127 and 128: luncheons with the Chilean Congress
Page 129 and 130: how Lister managed to have such a l
Page 131 and 132: 62 Letter, Kim Dae Jung to George L
Page 133 and 134: 129 Library of Congress, Authoritar
Page 135 and 136: movement—in particular, by insist
Page 137 and 138: Lister’s other political base was
Page 139 and 140: State Department as well as human r
Page 141 and 142: open a political conversation with
Page 143 and 144: Archival Documents Bibliography Abr
Page 145 and 146: Lister, George. Memo to Mr. William
Page 147 and 148: Lister, George. Memo to ARA Office
Page 149 and 150: Lister, George. Memo to Elliott Abr
Page 151 and 152: U.S. State Department. Career Histo
Page 153 and 154: Library of Congress, Chile: The Con
Page 155 and 156: Shlaudeman, Harry. Former Assistant
Page 157 and 158: Memorial Service for George Lister.
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Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

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