Copyright by Gregory Krauss 2007 - The University of Texas at Austin

opinion of the text. Lister suggested several changes which made the text less
confrontational but probably more likely to garner support from State Department
officials for Korean democracy. 64 Kim accepted Lister’s changes, and he gave the
speech to a standing room crowd on January 23, 1985. The speech was a “great
success” and was met by “much applause” Lister reported to Abrams that day. 65 After
the speech, Kim lunched at the eighth floor restaurant with various officials, mainly
from the East Asian and human rights bureaus. 66
Soon after the speech Kim returned to South Korea and was placed under
house arrest. His return, however, helped intensify the pro-democracy movement. 67
At the human rights bureau, Lister became “inundated” with visits from Korean
democratic groups. 68 U.S. policy towards the South Korean regime finally started to
change. Ambassador David Walker, who had refused to meet with the democratic
opposition, was replaced in 1986. 69 In February 1987, Assistant Secretary of State
Gaston Sigur, Wolfowitz’s successor at the East Asian bureau gave a speech in which
he called on the Korean government to democratize or face losing U.S. support. 70
Sigur’s comments were followed by more U.S. pressure. 71 In June 1987, Chun agreed
to relinquish the South Korean presidency and allow direct elections. 72 Kim Dae Jung
ran in those elections and lost, but democracy in South Korea had been largely
restored.
James Fowler has written that U.S. public pressure was one of the keys to
Chun’s decision to permit elections in 1987. 73 Attempting to explain U.S. policy,
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