Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka
Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Baszn Özeti
Ex-~ndon-ballker Ahmed Chalabi, the
leader of the best-known opposition group,
the Iraqi National Congress, is derided by
spooks and diplomats as an opportunist
with no real following in Iraq. The CIA,
meanwhile, is busily looking for its own
Man on a White Horse to ride into Baghdad.
Itis doubtful that volunteers are rushing
forward. Kurds in the north ofIraq and
Shiites in the south still bitterly complain
that the CIA abandoned the opposition to
the tender -mercies of Saddam's secret
police after the gulf war.
The hawks assert that once the revolution
begins and the American bombs start
to fall, the Iraqi people, many of wh~m
hate and fear their ruler, will rise up in rebellion.
In this scenario, Saddam's own Republican
Guard will march on the palace.
But what if the troops stay in their barracks
and the people do not welcome their liberators
with open arms? American ground
soldiers will have to grind it out-house
to house, if necessary. Pentagon officials
shudder at the prospect of urban streetfighting;
"Black Hawk Down" was all too
realistic a movie. The Joint Chiefs say
that invading Iraq will require between
100,000 and 200,000 U.S. troops. (During
the gulf war, America sent
500,000 troops to the region,
but that was overkill, and
since then smart bombs have
gotten smarter.)
The United States is likely to
get the grudging cooperation at
Iraq'sneighbors, Thrkey and
Kuwait. Saudi Arabia will be
harder. At a minimum, the
United States will need to use
Saudi airspace to refuel its warplanes,
and the only state-ofthe-art
air-command center in
the region is at the Prince
Sultan Air Base in the Saudi
desert. The Saudi princes have
already said that they oppose
an American attack on any
Arab capital, Baghdad included.
When he travels to the Middle
East in two weeks, Cheney
is expected to try to change
their minds. The Saudis will
want reassurances that the
United States will stick around
to clean up the mess after Saddam
falls. They may also want
American support for a still- _
emerging Arab peace initiative
to try to control the interminable
and ever-bloodier conflict
between Israel and the
Palestinians.
Bush "43" would like to forge a coalition
along the lines of the new world order put
together by his father for the gulf war. But
America's European allies are threatening
to stand on the sidelines with their arms
crossed. Conceivably, the Bush administration
could muster some support by provoking
a casus belli. This spring the U.N.
Security Council is expected to demand
that Saddam allow in international arms
inspectors to identifY and eliminate his
WMD. If Saddam says no, there may be
more support for U.S. intervention. Bush
administration officials fear, however, that
Saddam will play the fox and say yes.
Washington does not want to be drawn
into the exasperating game of Lucy-andthe-football
that Saddam played with U.N.
inspectors during the Clinton administration.
A senior administration official
told NEWSWEEK that the United States
will demand "total, unfettered, 24-houra:-day,
36S-day-a-year" inspection rights.
Saddam is not likely to permit armscontrol
inspectors into his bedroom.
There is one more uncertainty in the
campaign to get rid of Saddam, and it is the
most frightening. The Iraqi strongman is
not a suicidal religious fanatic; he does not
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appear to wantto -die ci: martyr's death.
But what if he feels trapped, believing
that the Americans really are coming for
him, dead or alive? Will he lash out and
try to use his chemical or biological
weapons? Before the gulfwar, Bush "41's"
secretary of State, James Baker, quietly
warned Saddam that ifIraq used a WMD,
the United States would no longer feel
constrained in its own use of weapons.
Rather than risk the nuclear incineration
of Baghdad, Sadd am did not fire off any
rounds from his chem-bio arsenal. But
American war aims in 1991 did not include
"regime change"; in the next war,
Saddam's demise will be the war aim.
Bush's team may advise the president
that Saddam lacks the capacity to use a
WMD against the United States or its allies.
But intelligence is always imperfect;
Bush's advisers will not be able to offer any
guarantees. The president alone will have
to decide. That ,viII be the moment when
he weighs the true cost of fighting evil and
feels the real burden of command.
With JOHN BARRY, MICHAEL ISIKOFF,
MARK HOSEI'BALL, ROY GUTMAN, COLIN SOLOWAY,
TA1\1ARALIPPER and DANIEL KLAIDMAN in
Washinpon, and MARTHJl, BRANT with President Bush
NEWSWEEK MARCH 4, 2002
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